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Articles
Glowing in the Dark: How America's First
Transgenic Animal Escaped Regulation
Rebecca M. Bratspies
If you don't want to scare the public, you'd better have an agency
responsible, and you'd better have clear-cut rules, and you'd
better mandate that they be followed .... We don't have that.1
One fish, two fish, red fish, blue fish
Black Fish, blue fish, old fish, new fish.
2
The first commercially available transgenic3 (or genetically
modified "GM") animal went on sale in the United States on
January 5, 2004. The GloFish is an aquarium zebra danio
(Brachydanio rerio) that was genetically engineered to glow in
* Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law. This paper has benefited
from discussion at the CUNY Faculty Forum, and the World Aquaculture
Society's Aquaculture America 2005. Special thanks go to Bill Taylor for
suggesting this project and to Tracy Dobson, Ruthann Robson, B. Allen
Schulz, and Donna Lee for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this
paper, and to Laura Rabiee for research assistance.
1. Arthur Caplan, Chair of the University of Pennsylvania Center for
Medical Ethics, as quoted in Gregory M. Lamb, GloFish Zoom to Market,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 22, 2004, at 15.
2. DR. SEUSS, ONE FISH TWO FISH RED FISH BLUE FISH 3-4 (1960).
3. The term "transgenic" refers to an individual with an introduced or
novel genetic sequence integrated into its genetic makeup. See FOOD AND
AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO), FAO GLOSSARY OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, at
http://www.fao.orglbiotech/fimd-formalpha-n.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
Typically this term refers to an organism that has genes from another
organism inserted into its genome. That said, some scientists are conducting
research into autotransgenic organisms-with addition copies of their own
species' genes inserted. For a discussion of research involving autotransgenic
organisms, see T.J. Pandian, Guidelines for Research and Utilization of
Genetically Modified Fish, 81 CURRENT SCI. 1172 (2001), available at
http://www.ias.ac.in/currsci (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
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the dark.4 This novelty fish is marketed in every state of the
United States except California, where it is banned.5
Given the significant public and scientific concerns about
the safety and wisdom of this technology, one might have
expected the first introduction, of a transgenic animal to have
been an event marked by the full pageantry of formal
regulatory scrutiny. For example, since the federal government
has repeatedly announced that transgenic animals will be
regulated as "new animal drugs" (NAD), one might have
expected an especially rigorous approval process for the first
such NAD introduced into interstate commerce. Certainly one
might have expected a thorough environmental risk analysis.
While these expectations might have been reasonable, in this
case the expectations would have been entirely wrong.
Rather than engaging in heightened or even ordinary
regulatory scrutiny, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
4. These fish are marketed for aquarium uses under the name Night
Pearl Glo fish or TK-1 by Taikong Corporation of Taiwan. See TAIKONG
CORPORATION, SELECT VERSION, at http://www.azoo.com.tw/select.html (last
visited Apr. 21, 2005). For a skeptical discussion of these fish, see Andrew
Pollack, So the Fish Glow, But Will They Sell?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, at 5.
In 2002, Taiwan became the first country to authorize sales of a genetically
modified organism as a pet. According to some reports, 100,000 of the glowing
fish were sold in less than a month at $18.60 each. See Fact Index, GloFish, in
WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCOLPOEDIA, at http://www.fact-
index.com/g/gl/glofish.html (last visited February 24, 2005).
5. California law prohibits the import or sale of transgenic fish without a
permit or an exemption. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 671 (2004). Yorktown
Technologies requested an exemption which the California Fish and Game
Commission denied on December 3, 2003. See California Blocks Sales of
'Glofish' Pets, CNN.COM, Dec. 4, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/science/12/O4/fluorescent.fish.ap/ (last visited
February 24, 2005). In March of 2004, the Commission voted 3-1 to seek an
updated recommendation from the California Department of Fish and Game
on whether GloFish should be granted such an extension, and to hold public
hearings before making a final decision. See Dan Thompson, California
Reconsiders Nation's Only Bio-Pet Ban, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2004.04.02.fishwifex.htm (last
visited Mar. 18, 2005). To aid in its reconsideration, the Commission
requested more detailed information from the Department. During the
Commission's October 21, 2004 meeting, Agenda Item 10 was an "Update on
GloFish Regulatory Timeline" given by the Department of Fish and Game.
The Department reported that for an exemption, Yorktown would need to
complete an environmental impact report as required by the California
Environmental Quality Act. Cal. Fish and Game Comm'n, Meeting Agenda,
Oct. 21-22, 2004, at http://www.fgc.ca.gov/2004/102104agd.html. Included
was testimony by Alan Blake of Yorktown Technologies. Id. Audio from that
segment of the Commission meeting see
http://www.fgc.ca.gov/2004/2004mtgs.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
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the lead agency for regulating transgenic animals, instead
announced in 2003 that it would permit GloFish to enter into
interstate commerce wholly unregulated. 6 This decision not to
regulate rested on a three sentence official statement in which
the FDA announced that:
[b]ecause tropical aquarium fish are not used for food purposes, they
pose no threat to the food supply. There is no evidence that these
genetically engineered zebra danio fish pose any more threat to the
environment than their unmodified counterparts which have long
been widely sold in the United States. In the absence of a clear risk
to the public health, the FDA finds no reason to regulate these
particular fish.
7
This announcement that the FDA would not to regulate
GloFish meant that no federal agency was exercising any
oversight over the first commercially-available transgenic
animal.
The usual pattern for a new technological innovation is
intense regulatory scrutiny of the first market entrant, with
follow-on products receiving either comparable treatment or
relaxed scrutiny as the agency gains familiarity with the field.
8
Agencies tend to learn during the course of the first application,
with later entrants being the beneficiaries of the learning
curve. 9  Instead, GloFish offers a textbook example of
technological progress outpacing policy formation. The
regulatory vacuum GloFish revealed has sparked at least one
6. FDA Statement Regarding Glofish, U.S. Food & Drug. Admin. (Dec. 9.
2003), available at www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00994.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Glofish Statement].
7. Id.
8. In the 1970s, scientists responded to growing concerns that
biotechnology was developing more rapidly than was the ability to understand
or manage the risks it posed by developing the Asilomar self-regulation plan.
This plan was based on the conviction that standards of care "should be
greater at the beginning and modified as improvements in the methodology
occur and assessment of the risks change." Paul Berg et al., Asilomar
Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 188 SCI. 991, 991-92 (1975). This
same "go slow and learn from experience" model was certainly expressed in
the rhetoric of the Coordinated Framework on Biotechnology. See Coordinated
Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,305
(June 26, 1986) [hereinafter Coordinated Framework]. These principles
continue to resonate powerfully in the context of transgenic fish.
9. For example, the USDA began simplifying its procedures for the
introduction of certain genetically engineered plants after gaining experience
with the crops. See Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products:
Simplification of Requirements and Procedures for Genetically Engineered
Organisms, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,945 (May 2, 1997). For the simplified procedures
see 7 C.F.R. § 340.0 (2004).
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lawsuit' 0 and has drawn condemnation from scientists and
from the pet industry.1'
GloFish marked a momentous change in the status quo.
No longer limited to the relatively controlled realm of
experimental research, a transgenic animal is now freely sold
in interstate commerce. This watershed event is surely the
harbinger of things to come-we can expect a future in which
transgenic animals are regularly sold in commerce in the
United States and around the world. Proponents of other novel
transgenic organisms are already claiming that the GloFish's
regulatory path sets a precedent for regulating transgenic
organisms. 12 Quite frankly, it was precisely that possibility
that prompted this article. A future peopled (so to speak) with
transgenic animals may be inevitable, but there is still time to
choose the conditions and circumstances under which it will
unfold.
Getting regulatory policy right is critical. Only appropriate
and consistent regulatory structures will ensure that this new
technology is explored in a fashion that protects human health
and the environment, while still encouraging innovation. Since
the FDA is currently considering a proposal to approve
widespread aquaculture of transgenic salmon, the FDA's
approach to GloFish raises immediate and pressing concerns
10. See International Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Thompson, No.
1:04CV00063 (D.D.C. 2004). Docket entries are available at
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
11. For example, PetSmart refused to carry GloFish, citing concerns about
the long-term effects of genetic engineering on the fish themselves. See
Charles Q. Choi & Steve Nash, GloFish Draw Suit, THE SCIENTIST, Jan. 7,
2004, available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20040107/01/ (last
visited Mar. 18, 2005). Similarly, the Ornamental Aquatic Trade Association
labeled GloFish "an unwelcome addition to the marketplace," and announced
that transgenic fish have no place in the ornamental fish industry. See
Ornamental Aquatic Trade Association (OATA), Genetically Modified
Ornamental Fish, at http://www.ornamentalfish.org/
aquanautstatement/gmfish.php (last updated Aug. 27, 2004). Over eighty
percent of the readers surveyed at Practical FishKeeping opposed GM
ornamental fish. See California to Reconsider GM Fish Ban, PRACTICAL
FISHKEEPING, April 2, 2004, available at
http://www.practicalfishkeeping.co.uklpfk/pages/item.php?news=247 (last
visited Mar. 18, 2005).
12. Simon Brodie, CEO of Allerca, Inc., contends that "[a]s long as people
don't start eating cats and they don't enter the food chain, then we should be
handled like the GloFish." Paul Elias, Invention Is Nothing To Sneeze at-
Non-allergenic Cat in the Works, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, available at
http://www.suntimes.com/output/ news/cst-nws-cats28.html (last visited Mar.
18, 2005).
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about the environmental risks likely to flow from inadequate
regulation of this new technology. 13
To explore this issue, Part I of this article provides a brief
introduction to transgenic animals and the motivations behind
this research. Part II describes the New Animal Drug approval
process and measures what the FDA actually did in the
GloFish case against the statutory requirements for approving
a new animal drug under the federal Food Drug and Cosmetics
Act (FDCA). Part III compares the FDA's GloFish Declaration
with the FDA's responsibilities under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Part IV makes the case
that in its GloFish decision, the FDA inappropriately
substituted "substantial equivalence," an administrative policy
developed to coordinate agency oversight of biotechnology, for
the applicable statutory standards under the FDCA and NEPA.
This section highlights some broader administrative and
constitutional implications of the FDA's decision. Finally, Part
V explores the possible fallout from this decision for the FDA's
pending consideration of a NAD application for transgenic
salmon. In particular, this section identifies some sui generis
environmental concerns associated with aquaculture of
transgenic salmon and considers what the FDA's GloFish
decision may tell us about the FDA's willingness to fully
consider these questions.
I. MAKING TRANSGENIC ANIMALS
In just over a decade, genetic engineering (also called
"genetic modification," "GM," or "biotechnology") has emerged
as a powerful tool for agricultural production. By transferring
genetic material from organism to organism, researchers can
create wholly new, transgenic organisms. Many transgenic
agricultural plants have already been developed for use in the
United States and elsewhere. By 2004, the lion's share of the
soybeans, and significant percentages of the corn and cotton
grown in the United States were transgenic varieties. 14 There
13. Opponents of biotechnology have raised a series of human health
concerns associated with the proposed use of aquacultured transgenic salmon
for food. See, e.g., Janye Kay, 'Frankenfish' Spawn Controversy-Debate over
Genetically Altered Salmon, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 29, 2002, at A4. Those
concerns are largely outside the scope of this article, which focuses on
environmental issues.
14. The United States accounts for most of the genetically modified crops
planted in the world and each year a larger percentage of the American
20051
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has been a great deal of public controversy surrounding the use
of these transgenic or genetically modified plants. 15 Transgenic
animals raise even greater public concern. 16
GloFish may be the first transgenic animal on the market,
but there are many more waiting in the wings. Applications of
the technology range from the sublime to the frivolous.
Researchers are currently experimenting with producing
human blood proteins and other pharmaceuticals in transgenic
pigs and other animals. 17 Goats have been genetically modified
to produce spider silk in their milk.'8 Allerca, a division of
Geneticas Life Science, is currently taking orders for
transgenic, allergen-free cats. 19  The central regulatory
harvest is comprised of GM plantings. In 2004, GM soybeans accounted for
85% of the soybean acreage planted in the United States; GM cotton for 76% of
the cotton, and GM corn for 45% of the corn. For these and other data
pertaining to GM crops, see PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY,
AUG. 2004 FACTSHEET, GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES
(Aug. 2004), at http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/
display.php3?FactsheetID=2 (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). The underlying
data, as well as a wealth of other information on these crops are provided by
the Economic Research Service of USDA at
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!utlp/_s.7_0 A/7 0 lOB?
navid=DATASTATISTICS&parentnav=AGRCULTURE&navtype=RT (last
visited Mar. 18, 2005).
15. There are many organizations and advocacy groups trying to restrict
or prevent widespread adoption of these crops. Among the most prominent
are: The Center for Science in the Public Interest (http://www.cspinet.orgo), the
Union of Concerned Scientists (http://www.ucsusa.org), Greenpeace
(http://www.greenpeace.org/international-en), and the Center for Food Safety
(http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/home.cfm).
16. See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, NATIONAL SURVEY
(Sept. 27, 2004), at http://pewagbiotech.orglresearch/2004update/ (last visited
Mar. 19, 2005).
17. See David F. Betsch, Pharmaceutical Production in Transgenic
Animals (Iowa State Univ., N. Cent. Reg'l Extension, Biotechnology
Information Series (Bio-10), 2004), at http://www.nal.usda.gov/bic/
Educationres/iastate.info/biol0.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2005) (providing a
list of some of the pharmaceuticals under development). For an introduction
to this issue geared towards the nonscientist see David Gillespie, Genetic Sci.
Learning Ctr. at the Univ. of Utah, Pharming for Farmacueticals, at
http://gslc.genetics.utah.edu/features/pharming/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
18. See Christopher Helman, Charlotte's Goat, FORBES, Feb. 19, 2001, at
101; GM Goat Spins Web Based Future, BBC NEWS, Aug. 21, 2000, at
http://news.bbc.co.ukl/hi/sci/tech/889951.stm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
19. Allerca's website can be accessed at http://www.allercafoundation.org
(last visited Mar. 19, 2005). A quick perusal of the site reveals a widespread
animal cloning and genetic modification agenda. Among the more bizarre
projects is one called NIGHTSAVE which would implant jellyfish genes into
deer to create transgenic deer with fluorescent hair and skin when illuminated
by car headlights. Although this last project seems like the beginnings of an
462 [Vol. 6:2
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questions are real and immediate. Product developers and the
concerned public need to know that regulators will scrutinize
these novel organisms under credible, consistent, and
transparent standards designed to ensure human and
environmental safety.
A. WHAT DOES "TRANSGENIC" MEAN?
Legal discussions of biotechnology always begin with the
requisite definition section. I suspect that most readers stop
there-few lawyers have training in the natural sciences and
the jumble of words and concepts tend to leave readers longing
for some nice straightforward antitrust or rule against
perpetuities issues. It is a real challenge to present an
accessible introduction to the technology without
oversimplifying to the point of absurdity. Fortunately, lawyers
are generally accounted to be quick studies. In the spirit of
informing without overwhelming, I offer a relatively simple
introduction to the process of creating a transgenic fish and try
to direct interested readers to more detailed sources of
information.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 20 provides a useful
definitional starting point for a discussion of transgenic
organisms (though for purposes of the Protocol, the equivalent
term "living modified organism" or "LMO" is used). Under the
internet hoax, Allerca's CEO Simon Brodie, claims that the project is for real
and only needs funding. E-mail from Simon Brodie to Rebecca M. Bratspies
(Jan. 14, 2005, 19:48:00 EST) (on file with author).
20. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety grew out of Article 19 of the
Convention on Biological Diversity, which calls upon Parties to provide for the
effective participation in biotechnological research activities and the sharing of
its benefits and to consider a protocol on biosafety. Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 19, 31
I.L.M 818, 830 (1992), available at http://www.biodiv.org/docflegal/cbd-en.pdf
(last visited Apr. 24, 2005). The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted
in January 2000. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: About the Protocol, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafetyfbackground2.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
The Protocol was opened for signature from May 15, 2000 through June 4,
2001 and received 103 signatures. The Protocol entered into force on
September 11, 2003, ninety days after receipt of the 50th instrument of
ratification. SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY: FROM NEGOTIATION TO
IMPLEMENTATION, available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/bs-
brochure-02-en.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). The full text of the Cartagena
Protocol is available at www.biodiv.org/biosafety. The Protocol currently has
117 parties. Id.
20051
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Protocol, a living modified organism is "any living organism
that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained
through the use of modern biotechnology." 21  "Modern
biotechnology" is further defined to mean various laboratory
techniques for introducing novel DNA into cells or organelles. 22
These techniques permit researchers to either physically or
chemically transfer new genetic material from any organism to
any other organism. The principle criterion for being classified
as a technique of modern biotechnology is that the technique
"overcome natural physiological reproductive or recombinant
barriers" that would otherwise prevent the genetic exchange. 23
Or, in plain English, biotechnology allows scientists to
recombine genes themselves without regard for the biological
constraints of sexual or asexual reproduction that ordinarily
limit gene flow between organisms. This transferred genetic
material is the "transgene" in the term transgenic animal.
B. HAVEN'T WE BEEN GENETICALLY MODIFYING ORGANISMS
FOR MILLENNIA?
Farmers have certainly been genetically manipulating
plants and animals since the dawn of agriculture. Over the
millennia, farmers developed animal husbandry techniques for
selectively breeding livestock to enhance useful or desirable
traits, or to suppress undesirable ones. Selective breeding
enabled farmers to exploit the variations naturally present
within a species to develop new, more desirable strains. 24 Over
time, this process of selective breeding can produce a radically
altered species. For example, modern cows, pigs, goats and
chickens, all produced through centuries of selective breeding,
do not much resemble their wild counterparts and indeed are
largely unable to survive in the wild. Unlike modern
biotechnology, however, selective breeding can enhance or
suppress only those traits already present in a population. No
amount of selective breeding could transfer a spider gene to a
21. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, Jan. 29, 2000, at art. 3(g), 39 I.L.M 1027, 1027 (2000),
available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/articles.asp?lg=O&a=bsp.03 (last
visited Mar. 19, 2005).
22. Id.
23. Id. There is an additional requirement that the technique not be one
used in traditional breeding or selection.
24. For an explanation of these points, accessible to the non-scientist see
generally Feeding the Five Billion, ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2001.
[Vol. 6:2
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goat 25 or a jellyfish gene to a zebrafish. 26
Modern biotechnology has expanded the process of genetic
modification tremendously. Functional genes can be isolated
and transferred to an animal from any organism-across
species, class, phylum and kingdom. In other words, genetic
engineering enables breeders to recombine genes themselves.
This technology can create organisms that could not exist
without such intervention.
In many ways, the revolution of biotechnology "is pushing
society into rethinking what we want out of agriculture."
2 7
There are new possibilities for human intervention in the
biological world that never before existed. Most will agree that
this new technology poses both risks and benefits.
Unfortunately, in the vigorous public debate, advocates on all
sides are tempted to obscure either the benefits or the risks in
order to sway public opinion. While it is certainly true that
very few organisms that are part of the human environment
have escaped human genetic modification, claims that modern
biotechnology is somehow "more of the same" are often so
simplistic as to border on the absurd. Hyperbolic claims that
biotechnology necessarily involves "playing god with nature,"
are equally reductionist. These intellectual shortcuts do little
to further discourse and should be abandoned. The public
debate between supporters and opponents of biotechnology will
certainly continue for the foreseeable future-there are genuine
philosophical differences between the various camps.
Moreover, the technology is far too new for us fully to
understand its long-term costs and benefits. That said, the
extremes of the discussion seem totally out of step with how
this transformative technology fits into a history of human re-
creation of the natural world.
25. See GM Goat Spins Web of the Future, BBC NEWS, Aug. 21, 2000,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/sci/techI889951.stm (last visited Apr. 22,
2005).
26. This is, of course, the genetic modification that gave rise to the
GloFish. For a detailed description of this process, see infra section I.C.
27. BRIAN JOHNSON, CONSULTIVE GROUP ON INT'L AGRIC. RESEARCH,
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS AND OTHER ORGANISMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
AGRICULTURAL SUSTAINABILITY AND BIODIVERSITY 131, at
http://www.cgiar.org/biotech/rep01OO/Johnson.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
2005]
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C. WHY MAKE A TRANSGENIC FISH?
Assuming that one intends to make a transgenic animal,
there are many reasons to begin with fish. It is an unfortunate
fact that the success rates for creating transgenic animals are
quite low-about ten percent. 28  Out of every one hundred
organisms subject to the biotechnology techniques described
above, only about ten will be transformed, meaning they will
integrate and express the transgene. 29 And, expression of the
novel genetic material is only the first step. Researchers are
looking for individuals that not only express the transgene
themselves but also can pass it on to offspring generated
through normal reproduction. Altering the heritable genome is
the ultimate goal of these laboratory processes. A much
smaller percentage (about one percent) of individuals
expressing the transgene meet this test.30
Because of these low success rates, two unique aspects of
fish biology make fish a particularly attractive candidate for
genetic engineering. First, female fish produce eggs in the
millions. This sheer fecundity makes it easy for researchers to
obtain the large supply of eggs needed for experimentation
purposes (egg availability is often a limiting factor in
mammalian experimentation and is a concern frequently raised
in the context of human stem cell research).31 Moreover, in the
ordinary course, fertilized fish eggs develop outside the fish's
body-making in vitro cultivation of the newly modified
organisms a simpler and cheaper prospect for fish than for
28. See John Beardmore & Joanne Porter, Genetically Modified
Organisms and Aquaculture, FAO FISHERIES CIRCULAR No. 989 3-8 (2003)
[hereinafter FAO FISHERIES].
29. Techniques for creating transgenic organisms typically include
microinjection, electroporation, use of microprojectiles and liposome mediated
transformation. Microinjection has been the preferred technique to introduce
novel genetic material to fish egg. See FAO FISHERIES, supra note 28, at 3-8.
For a description, complete with diagrams, of the techniques of genetic
engineering geared towards the lay reader, see PEW INST. ON FOOD &
BIOTECHNOLOGY, FUTURE FISH: ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND REGULATION OF
TRANSGENIC FISH 7-9 (2003), available at http://pewagbiotech.org/research
fish/fish.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2005) [hereinafter FUTURE FISH].
30. See FAO FISHERIES, supra note 28, at 11.
31. See FUTURE FISH, supra note 29, at 4-5. In January of 2004, just as
GloFish were reaching stores, Japanese and United States researchers
announced an innovative technique to genetically modify zebrafish using
sperm cells grown in vitro, rather than eggs. See Kayoko Kurita et al.,
Transgenic Zebrafish Produced by Retroviral Infection of In Vitro Cultured
Sperm, 101 PROCEEDINGS NAT'LACAD. SCI. 1263, 1263-67 (Feb. 3, 2004).
[Vol. 6:2
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mammals. Together, the large supply of fish eggs and the
relatively easy laboratory development of transformed eggs
mean that experimentally transformed fish can be grown in
large number. Experimental success is thus more likely.
D. GLOFISH: THE FIRST TRANSGENIC FISH SOLD IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
GloFish are the first transgenic animal to be sold
commercially in the United States. 32  Through genetic
engineering, a research group at the National University of
Singapore created GloFish by adding a gene for a red
fluorescent protein from a sea anemone to conventional
zebrafish.33 Thanks to this gene, the normally black-and-silver
zebrafish glow bright red under black or ultraviolet light. The
Singapore laboratory that produced GloFish was engaged in
research aimed at developing a biological system for pollution
detection, 34 but novelty aquarium use has become the
commercial driver for production of GloFish.
Texas-based Yorktown Technologies purchased exclusive
international marketing rights for GloFish in early 2003.
Through contracts with two large Florida purveyors of
aquarium fish (5-D Tropical and Segrest Farms),35 Yorktown
produces GloFish for commercial sale throughout the United
States.36 In addition to the red GloFish currently on the
market, Yorktown expects to market fluorescent green, orange,
and yellow GloFish in the near future. 37 While zebrafish are
32. Zebra danao, which were modified to create GloFish, are a standard of
laboratory research. The genome of the fish has been well characterized, and
can model many biological systems useful for research.
33. See Zhiyuan Gong et al., Development of Transgenic Fish for
Ornamental and Bioreactor by Strong Expression of Fluorescent Proteins in the
Skeletal Muscle, 308 BIOCHEMICAL & BIOPHYSICAL RES. COMM. 58, 58-63
(2003).
34. See Nat'l Univ. of Singapore, Zebra Fish as Pollution Indicators, at
http://www.nus.edu.sg/corporate/research/gallery/researchl2.htm (last visited
Mar. 19, 2005).
35. In Florida, aquaculture is big business, with farm gate receipts valued
at $99 million in 2001. See DIV. OF AQUACULTURE, FL. DEP'T OF AGRIC. AND
CONSUMER. SERVS., 2003-2004 FLORIDA AQUACULTURE PLAN 3, available at
http://www.floridaaquaculture.comlpub.atm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
Tropical ornamental fish and plants are Florida's most valuable aquaculture
products and compose over 60% of the states aquaculture sales. See id. at 9.
36. Eric Hallerman, GloFish, The First GM Animal Commercialized:
Profits Amid Controversy, ISB NEWS REPORT, June 2004, at
http://www.isb.vt.edu/articles/ jun04O5.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
37. See Pollack, supra note 4, at 5.
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quite inexpensive-each aquarium fish generally sells for
around thirty-three cents-the fluorescent GloFish are priced
between $5 and $15 each. 38 Yorktown declines to make public
its sales figures for GloFish,39 but newspaper reports indicate
that in the weeks following their release, the company claimed
to have sold tens of thousands of the transgenic fish.40
E. THE Focus OF RESEARCH
Although this article takes GloFish as its starting point,
transgenic ornamental fish are really a side note to the broader
discussion of regulating transgenic fish. The vast majority of
research effort has been devoted to modifying high value food
fish to make them better suited for aquaculture. Currently, the
fastest growing sector of aquaculture involves raising
carnivorous fish for western markets.41 Many of aquaculture's
most vocal boosters are promoting aquaculture of transgenic
fish. It is this prospect of large-scale aquaculture 42 of
genetically engineered food fish, especially salmon and similar
high-value carnivorous fish, that has the aquaculture industry
salivating, and many policymakers scared.
The first reports of the application of genetic engineering to
fish appeared in the 1980s. 43 Since then, there has been a
38. See Dawn Fallilk, GloFish Filling Trendy Tanks, PHIL. INQUIRER, Jan.
12, 2004, at Al.
39. Personal Communication from Yorktown Technologies (on file with
author).
40. Chang Ai-Lien, GloFish Sparks off Classroom Study in US, STRAITS
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004.
41. See FAO FISHERIES, supra note 28, at 18.
42. Dwindling wild stocks and high market prices have made salmon a
particularly attractive candidate for aquaculture. K. Sandnes & A. Ervick,
Industrial Marine Fish Farming, in SUSTAINABLE AQUACULTURE 97, 97 (N.
Svennevig et. al. eds., 1999). By the late 1990s, salmon aquaculture was
producing over 900,000 tons of fish per year. See id. In the United States
alone, sale of carnivorous aquaculture products, largely salmon, has grown
from $45 million in 1974 to over $1.1 billion in 2000, and is a $200 million
euro business in the European Union. See PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS,
NORTHERN AQUACULTURE STATISTICS 2000-YEAR IN REVIEW, at http://ocad-
bcda.gc.ca/enetresults2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2005); CENT. STATISTICS
OFFICE IRELAND, FISHERIES STATISTICS 2002 (2003), at
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/agriculture/current/fishery.p
df (last visited Mar. 3, 2005). The United States Department of Commerce has
publicly committed itself to building domestic aquaculture into a $5 billion
industry by 2025-a five-fold increase from 2001 levels. See U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, AQUACULTURE POLICY, at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ocs/
tradecommercialfDOCAQpolicy.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
43. See N. Maclean & S. Talmar, Injection of Cloned Genes Into Rainbow
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burst of genetic modification activity in aquaculture research
and development. Indeed, by 1990, fourteen species of
transgenic food fish had been produced in laboratories around
the world, 44 and in 2003, the FAO reported twenty-three
aquatic transgenic species.45 The majority of the research and
development efforts to date have focused on improving growth
rates or efficiency of food conversion for salmon (and similar
food fish) raised through aquaculture. 46 Through insertion of
additional copies of fish growth hormone (GH) genes, 47 coupled
with mammalian promoters, researchers have been able to
accelerate fish growth rates, with modified fish growing two to
eleven times faster than their non-modified counterparts.
48
Increased growth means that fish reach marketable size
sooner, which reduces overhead costs for fish farmers.49 Under
Trout Eggs, 82 J. EMBRYOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL MORPHOLOGY 187, 187
(1984); Z. Zhu et al., Novel Gene Transfer into the Fertilized Eggs of the
Goldfish (Carassius acuratus L. 1758), 1 J. APPLIED ICHTHYOLOGY 31, 31-34
(1984).
44. See A. R. Kapuscinski & E.M. Hallerman, Implications of
Introduction of Transgenic Fish into Natural Ecosystems, 48 CAN. J.
FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 99, 100 (1991). This figure does not include the use
of transgenic fish as a research model within laboratories exploring basic
biological questions, but only those modifications intended to alter traits to
make fish more economical to grow, more nutritious, or otherwise more
desirable to consumers and producers.
45. See FAO FISHERIES, supra note 28, at 3.
46. See id. at 2. Creating transgenic fish with increased cold tolerance is
a second area of significant research though to date the research has not been
as successful. For a chart of transgenic fish under development, see FUTURE
FISH, supra note 29, at 6.
47. Different transgenes produce different rates of growth. For example,
use of an all-fish GH gene construct to make transgenic Atlantic salmon has
produced a twofold increase of the transgenic fish growth rate. See S.J. Du et
al., Growth Enhancement in Transgenic Atlantic Salmon by the Use of an 'All
Fish" Chimeric Growth Hormone Gene Construct, 10 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 176,
178 (1992). Additionally, the use of ocean pout antifreeze promoter and
salmon GH genes might produce up to a five-fold to thirty-fold increase in
weight after one year of growth. See R.H. Devlin et al., Production of
Germline Transgenic Pacific Salmonids with Dramatically Increased Growth
Performance, 52 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 1376, 1381 (1995); See
also R.H. Devlin et al., Transmission and Phenotypic Effects of an
Antifreeze/GH Gene Construct in Coho Salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch), 137
AQUACULTURE 161, 167 (1995); R.H. Devlin et al., Brief Communication:
Extraordinary Salmon Growth, 371 NATURE 209, 209 (1994).
48. See M.A. Rahman, & N. Maclean,, Growth Performance of Transgenic
Tilapia Containing an Exogenous Piscine Growth Hormone Gene, 173
AQUACULTURE 333, 334 (1999).
49. For charts documenting this increased growth rate, and a description
of the commercial expectations of transgenic fish, see G. L. Fletcher et al.,
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laboratory conditions, this increased growth rate has also been
correlated with a significant increased efficiency in feed
conversion.50
The economic attraction of these modifications is obvious.
Unfortunately, the very factors that make transgenic fish an
attractive commercial prospect might also pose serious risks,
not only to wild relatives but to whole ecosystems once these
fish escape into the wild. Unlike domestic farm animals,
laboratory or farm raised fish easily become feral and compete
with indigenous populations.51 Because of their novel
characteristics, transgenic escapees could pose even greater
threats to wild population than do conventional fish. The
negative consequences could be devastating.
To date, the light regulatory scheme imposed on
aquaculture has been wholly unable to resolve the escape
problem, and fish farmers seem to treat escaped fish as a cost
of doing business. The magnitude of the escape problem
prompted National Research Council (NRC) to call for caution
in experimentation and commercialization of transgenic fish.52
The NRC concluded that the many critical unknowns prevented
an informed judgment about whether or how to proceed with
Transgenic Salmon: Potential and Hurdles, PROCEEDING OECD WORKSHOP
ON MOLECULAR FARMING HELD IN LE GRANDE MOTTE, FR.,. Sept. 3-6, 2000, at
http://www.aquabounty.com/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
50. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ANIMAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE-
BASED CONCERNS 89 (2002), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309084393.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005)
[hereinafter NAT'L RESEARCH. COUNCIL].
51. There is a growing body of evidence that escaped aquaculture fish are
fully capable of establishing themselves in the environments to which they
escape. This phenomenon already poses ecological risks to wild salmon stocks.
See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 90-91. Recent studies
indicate that thirty to forty percent of the Atlantic salmon caught in the
Northern Atlantic Ocean originated from farmed fish. See L.P. Hansen et al.,
High Numbers of Farmed Atlantic Salmon, Salmo salar L, Observed in
Oceanic Waters North of the Faroe Islands, 24 AQUACULTURE & FISHERIES
MGMT. 777, 777 (1993). In some parts of Norway, fish from farmed origins are
the majority of animals captured. See H. Saegrov et al., Escaped Farmed
Atlantic Salmon Replace the Original Salmon Stock in the River Vosso,
Western Norway, 54 ICES J. MARINE SCI., 1166, 1167 (1997). On the east
coast of North America, escaped farm salmon outnumber wild fish by as much
as ten to one in some rivers. See ATLANTIC SALMON FED'N, ATLANTIC SALMON
AQUACULTURE: A PRIMER, at
www.asf.ca/backgrounder/asfaquacbackgrounder.pff (last visited Mar. 19,
2005).
52. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 92.
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commercialization of transgenic fish. 53 In light of these high
stakes, the relaxed, even inattentive, regulatory scrutiny the
FDA applied to GloFish appears wildly inappropriate.
II. THE FEDERAL FOOD DRUG AND COSMETICS ACT IS
A POOR FIT FOR REGULATING TRANSGENIC ANIMALS
Under a 1986 executive policy known as the Coordinated
Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology Products (the
"Coordinated Framework"),54 many federal agencies jointly
supervise the myriad uses and products of biotechnology in the
United States. The Coordinated Framework declared that
biotechnology products would be evaluated under the same
laws and processes used to review products produced without
biotechnology. 55 As a result, regulatory control over these
products is allocated among various federal agencies based on
each agency's historical role under pre-existing statutes.
56
Three agencies, the USDA, the EPA and the FDA have primary
regulatory authority over various aspects of biotechnology.
These agencies have cobbled together a regulatory structure in
which at least ten different pre-existing statutes regulate
portions of this new technology. Unfortunately, many
transgenic organisms confound conventional regulatory
categories. To respond to the sui generis challenges posed by
these genetically modified organisms (GMOs), regulators rely
on increasingly creative interpretations of these existing laws.
Transgenic animals are a case in point.
Under the Coordinated Framework, the FDA claims
primary regulatory authority over transgenic animals,
including fish, by virtue of its "new animal drug" authority
under the FDCA.57 The FDCA provides a comprehensive
scheme to protect the public from drugs that may be unsafe or
ineffective for their intended uses. As part of this scheme, the
Act establishes a pre-marketing clearance system for new
53. See id.
54. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 8 at 23,302.
55. See id. at 23,303.
56. For a critique of this regulatory scheme, see Thomas 0. McGarity,
Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 35 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 432-64 (2002). See generally Rebecca M. Bratspies,
Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 593 (2003).
57. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392
(2000). See also Coordinated Framework, supra note 8, at 23,304.
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animal drugs (NAD). No NAD may be introduced into
interstate commerce unless the FDA has approved the New
Animal Drug Application (NADA) for that drug.58
The FDCA defines a new animal drug as "any drug
intended for use for animals other than man, including any
drug intended for use in animal feed . . . "59 Drugs are further
defined as products "intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body of man or other animals."60 The FDA has
interpreted this authority to reach transgenic fish on the theory
that the transgene itself, and the protein for which it codes,
affects the "structure and function" of the receiving animal in a
manner analogous to that of a veterinary drug and can
therefore be considered a new animal drug.61 It is beyond
dispute that in drafting the FDCA, Congress never
contemplated it being applied to such a situation. Not only
does the FDCA provide, at best, hazy authority for regulating
animal biotechnology, but there are also serious questions
about the FDA's institutional capacity to address some of the
potential hazards posed by transgenic animals.62
A. THE FDA's NEW ANIMAL DRUG AUTHORITY MAY NOT
ENCOMPASS THE RELEVANT ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS
Promising that the public's interests will be fully protected
in any decision to approve transgenic animals for general use,
58. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1) provides:
(1) A new animal drug shall, with respect to any particular use or
intended use of such drug, be deemed unsafe for the purposes of
section 351(a)(5) of this title and section 342(a)(2)(D) of this title
unless-
(A) there is in effect an approval of an application filed pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section with respect to such use or intended use
of such drug ....
A drug deemed unsafe under § 360b(a)(1) is considered adulterated under 21
U.S.C. § 351(a)(5), and adulterated drugs may not be introduced into
interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a).
59. See id. § 321(v).
60. See id. § 321(g)(1)(C).
61. OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, CASE STUDY No. I: GROWTH-
ENHANCED SALMON, CEQ/OSTP ASSESSMENT: CASE STUDIES OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY 1, 13-14 [hereinafter
CEQ/OSTP Study], available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ ceq-ostp-study2.pdf
(last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
62. For a concerned suggestion that the FDA's current regulatory
structures cannot effectively evaluate the environmental issues surrounding
transgenic fish, see generally FUTURE FISH, supra note 29.
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the federal government has assured the public that the FDA is
fully prepared to regulate transgenic fish (ornamental as well
as food fish) under the FDCA.63 The government has also
expressed confidence in its ability to do so in a manner that will
satisfactorily protect the environment.
64
However, the FDA's casual dismissal of the environmental
concerns surrounding GloFish tells a different story, one that is
perhaps understandable in light of the FDA's mandate and
expertise to protect human food and drug supply but which also
provides little comfort for those raising environmental
concerns. 65 The FDA's authority is limited by the FDCA's
express purpose to protect American consumers from the risks
of consuming unsafe or ineffective food and drugs. 66 This
purpose makes the FDCA an awkward fit for regulating
ornamental fish like the GloFish or other "companion animals."
The FDA is predominantly concerned with questions of how
consumption of NADs may affect human health.67 There is
little room and even less incentive for the FDA to explore fully
the many environmental concerns that might be raised by
63. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 16. It is the Center for
Veterinary Medicine that is directly responsible for regulation of animal
drugs, feeds and medical devices under the FDCA. 21 U.S.C. § 301. For
convenience, this article refers to the CVM and the FDA collectively as the
FDA.
64. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 45. Although this study claimed
that it was not a definitive policy statement that created any rights, it seems
evident that this document is the definitive statement of the Executive
Branch's approach to implementing the authority that Congress has delegated
to it pursuant to various statutes. Just as no federal agency would view itself
as free to disregard the CEQ/OSTP study in favor of a more stringent or
additional regulation for transgenic animals, the FDA ought not be free to
waive sua sponte the regulatory requirements the administration has
indicated it views as binding.
65. The FDA was created in 1938 following the tragedy surrounding
sulfanilamide. See Paul J. Quirk, Food and Drug Administration, in THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION 196-97 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). Life saving
sulfa drugs had just been discovered, and a company eager to market the drug
in liquid form peddled sulfanilamide dissolved in diethylene glycol. Id.
Unfortunately, the solvent turned out to be toxic and killed more than one
hundred people. Id. This incident underscored the need for pre-market
regulation of drugs. Id.; see also United States v. Sage Pharms, Inc., 210 F.3d
475, 479 (5th Cir. 2000) (recounting history and explaining FDCA is "designed
to ensure the nation's drug supply is safe and effective.").
66. 21 U.S.C. § 360b (2000).
67. 21 C.F.R. §§ 510, 514 (2004). These sections govern new animal drugs
and new animal drug applications respectively and focus much of their
attention on residues in human food and threats to human health from these
drugs.
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transgenic ornamental fish.
Moreover, this same focus on human health that inhibits
the FDA from adequately considering the problems posed by
transgenic ornamental fish also poses significant barriers to the
FDA's ability to regulate other transgenic animals. While the
FDCA may give the FDA legal authority to regulate the food
safety aspects of transgenic fish, the emerging consensus is
that the bigger risk is that transgenic fish will make their way
into the wild and pose a significant environmental threat.68
The federal government claims that, as part of its safety
assessment for a new animal drug, the FDA considers"environmental effects that directly or indirectly affect the
health of humans or animals."69 Advocates of biotechnology
tout a 1998 FDA guidance document, 70 directed at a wholly
different set of products, as evidence that the FDA approval
signifies consideration of a wide range of environmental harms
including "lasting effects on ecological community dynamics"
that fall within its consideration of activities that "significantly
affect the quality of the human environment."71 Unfortunately,
this FDA guidance is limited to those situations in which"available data establish that there is a potential for serious
harm to the environment at the expected level of exposure."72
This guidance, even were it to apply to NADs, therefore is
limited to situations in which data already exists and does not
suggest that the FDA is willing to require applicants to develop
such data or to investigate the possible ecological consequences
of their proposed NADs.
68. See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50.
69. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 14; see also 21 C.F.R. 25.15(b)
(directing the FDA to consider whether a proposed action may seriously affect
the human environment).
70. The emphasis on this tenuously related Guidance Document is part of
a coordinated strategy. For example, the identical document, 5 MYTHS ABOUT
FEDERAL REGULATION OF TRANSGENIC FISH, is available verbatim from Aqua
Bounty and from BIO. See AQUA BOUNTY TECHS., 5 MYTHS ABOUT FEDERAL
REGULATION OF TRANSGENIC FISH, available at
http://www.aquabounty.com/5mythsl.html and BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG., 5
MYTHS ABOUT FEDERAL REGULATION OF TRANSGENIC FISH, available at
http://www.bio.org//animals/salmonmyths2.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
BIO is an ag-biotech lobbying group, and Aqua Bounty has a biotech company
with a NAD for transgenic salmon currently before the FDA.
71. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN DRUG AND BIOLOGICS APPLICATIONS
6 (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/1730fnl.pdf.
72. Id.
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Moreover, the fact that the FDA could dismiss the first
transgenic animal so lightly suggests that it would be a
mistake to make too much of the language in this guidance
document. The government itself concedes that the FDA's
authority may not extend to all environmental impacts,
particularly those impacts that are mainly felt by the
ecosystem itself rather than by human beings. 73 The limits
inherent to the FDA's regulatory mandate raise real questions
about whether the FDA has enough flexibility and expertise to
address the environmental and ecological issues unique to
transgenic fish. The FDA's decision not to regulate GloFish
certainly does nothing to generate public confidence that the
FDA is attuned to the concerns of environmental protection.
B. THE FDA'S GLOFISH DECISION DID NOT SATISFY THE FDA's
STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD DRUG AND
COSMETICS ACT
Under the FDCA, the promoter of a new product must file,
and the FDA must approve, a new animal drug application
before a new animal drug can be sold in interstate commerce.7 4
Unless this application is filed, the FDA is statutorily
mandated to deem the product "unsafe"75 and "adulterated."76
Adulterated products may not be sold in interstate commerce. 77
73. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 14. The FDA clearly has some
capacity to consider environmental harms. For example, in approving
recombinant bovine somatotrophin, (rBST) a bovine growth hormone produced
via genetically engineered bacteria, the FDA expressly considered some
environmental risks that the new animal drug might pose-namely changing
land use patterns, water quality, carbon dioxide emissions and syringe
disposal. Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1186 (W.D. Wisc. 1995); see
also CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 15 (listing other environmental risks
examined in the rBST application, specifically, water quality, carbon dioxide
emissions, and syringe disposal). The environmental issues considered in
Stauber were fairly directly related to human health concerns. What is less
clear is the FDA's ability to consider ecosystem harms or damage to wild
species-the primary environmental concerns raised by transgenic fish. See,
e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50 at 111; FUTURE FISH, supra
note 29, at 11-26.
74. 21 U.S.C. § 360b (2000).
75. Id. § 360b(a)(1) (unless a NAD application is filed, new animal drugs
shall "be deemed unsafe for the purposes of section 351(a)(5)").
76. Id. § 351(a)(5) ("A drug or device shall be deemed to be adulterated...
if it is a new animal drug which is unsafe within the meaning of section 360b
of this title .... ).
77. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) in relevant part prohibits "[t]he introduction or
delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or
cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded." Id. § 331(a). There is no denying
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The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) expressed the
Executive Branch's official intent to regulate transgenic fish,
including ornamental fish, as new animal drugs. 78 It therefore
came as a surprise when, in its first foray into this regulatory
thicket, the FDA decided that GloFish need not comply with
any of these NAD regulatory procedures.
The NAD application process is designed to force
applicants to demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of new
drugs before permitting the drugs to be marketed. 79 A drug is
"new" if it has not been through an FDA approval process8 o and
is not generally recognized as safe8l and effective (GRAS).82 A
new drug that is not GRAS and is not the subject of an
approved NAD application nor falls under an effective
investigational exception is adulterated, and, if the drug is
introduced into interstate commerce, criminal prosecution may
result.8 3 GloFish clearly qualify as an adulterated product
under this standard. GloFish were not approved through
either a NAD application or an effective investigational
exception. Nor can GloFish qualify under the statute's
definition of GRAS. Rather than apply the statutory
standards, the FDA instead concluded that "[iun the absence of
a clear risk to the public health, the FDA finds no reason to
regulate these particular fish."84
that GloFish are currently sold in interstate commerce.
78. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 16. FDA advisory opinions and
guidelines have the force of law and obligate the agency to follow them until
amended or revoked. 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.85 (2004).
79. 21 U.S.C. § 360b; 21 C.F.R. § 514.1(b)(8).
80. 21 U.S.C. § 321(w).
81. Id. § 321(p)(2). The Act requires the FDA to consider four specific
factors when assessing safety: 1) the likelihood that the drug or a substance
formed in food because of the drug will be consumed; 2) the cumulative effect
that the drug will be likely to have on man or other animals; 3) safety factors
that experts consider appropriate for extrapolating from animal
experimentation data; and 4) whether it is likely that the conditions of use
proposed or suggested in the labeling will be followed. Id. § 360b(d)(2); 21
C.F.R. § 514.111(a)(4).
82. Effectiveness must be demonstrated on the basis of "substantial
evidence" that the drug "will have the effect is purports or is represented to
have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
proposed labeling thereof." 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(3).
83. Id. § 331(a).
84. See Glofish Statement, supra note 6. This decision rested primarily on
a conclusion that "[b]ecause tropical aquarium fish are not used for food
purposes, they pose no threat to the food supply." Id.
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In doing so, the FDA turned the statutory burden of proof
upside down. The FDCA does not require a "clear risk to public
health", nor indeed any evidence of threat, to trigger
regulation. On the contrary, the statute expressly requires
evidence of safety before sale of a product can be approved.
8 5
Any drug not proven safe must be rejected and the burden of
proof for demonstrating safety at all times rests squarely with
the proponent of a new drug.8 6 Assumptions of safety have no
place in this process.
The Coordinated Framework assigns primary regulatory
authority over transgenic animals to the FDA.s7 In conjunction
with the CEQ and OSTP, the FDA has already declared that
transgenic fish will be evaluated as new animal drugs.88 The
FDCA offers three options: a new animal drug is either 1)
approved through the statutory process; 2) generally recognized
as safe and effective (GRAS); or 3) an adulterated product
subject to seizure.8 9 The first option is clearly inapplicable as
the FDA did not approve GloFish through the statutory NAD
process. For the FDA to have been acting within its statutory
mandate, the FDA's GloFish declaration must, therefore, have
been an assertion that GloFish satisfied the second statutory
option and could be considered GRAS.
C. GLOFISH CANNOT BE CONSIDERED GRAS UNDER THE FDCA
Courts have repeatedly held that a finding that a drug is"generally regarded as safe and effective," (GRAS) requires
evidence of "adequate and well-controlled investigations . . . to
evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved . . . ."90 Thus, a
GRAS determination involves two steps. First, there must be a
showing of an expert consensus that the product is safe and
effective; and second, the expert consensus must be based on
"substantial evidence" as defined in the FDCA and in FDA
regulations. Such a GRAS determination must be based on
85. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(w).
86. See 21 U.S.C. § 360b(b)(1) (listing the applicant's required disclosures
to the FDA).
87. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 8, at 23,309.
88. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text; 21 U.S.C. § 321(v).
90. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609,
629-30 (1972). Weinberger concludes that a GRAS determination must be
based on the same substantial evidence standard that the FDA uses under 21
U.S.C. § 360b(d)(3) to approve a NADA. See id. at 613.
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evidence published in the relevant scientific literature 91 and
supported by a new drug application containing full reports of"adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show
whether or not such drug is safe for use" under the likely
conditions of its use. 92 Anecdotal information (like testimony of
physicians unsupported by controlled investigation or scientific
publication) cannot constitute substantial evidence that a drug
is GRAS. 93 Drug purveyors have unsuccessfully attempted to
substitute real world experience for those regulatory factors. 94
A controlled investigation and publication of the results are
explicit statutory conditions that must be met before the FDA
can conclude that a drug is GRAS.
No such controlled investigation occurred with GloFish.
No peer-reviewed publications support the safety of this novel
organism. Although Yorktown's website does display "letters of
support"95 from reputable geneticists, these letters have not
been subjected to peer review and are not the product of
controlled laboratory investigation. As such, these letters are
more akin to the anecdotal experience of physicians than to the
kind of evidence sufficient for a GRAS determination.
Under the plain language of the statute, GloFish therefore
cannot be considered GRAS. Indeed, the FDA does not make
such a claim. Instead, the FDA does something far more
problematic-it implies into the statute a threshold question of
whether the NAD is worthy of FDCA consideration. The FDA
then claims sole and unreviewable discretion to determine
whether its imputed threshold has been satisfied. 96 With its
91. See United States v. Pro-Ag, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 1219, 1230 (D. Minn.
1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1992).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(1)(A).
93. See United States v. Undetermined Quantities of Various Articles of
Drug. .. Equidantin Nitrofurantoin Suspension . 675 F.2d 994, 1000 (8th
Cir. 1982).
94. See United States v. Undetermined Quantities of Clear Plastic Bags of
an Article of Drug for Veterinary Use .. .WRM-RID Dog Wormer, 963 F.
Supp. 641, 645 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd, 145 F.3d 1335 (6th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that a forty-three year "track record" was not sufficient to satisfy
the substantial evidence requirement for a GRAS determination).
95. See Glofish, Glofish Fluorescent Fish Science, at
www.glofish.comlscience.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2005) (containing letters of
support from five doctors).
96. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 27-29, International Tech.
Ctr. v. Thompson, No. 1:04CV00062(RMU) (D.D.C. filed 2004) (giving the
substance of its claim that the decision not to regulate GloFish is
unreviewable), available at http://pacer/psc/uscourts.gov (last visited Apr. 15,
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GloFish decision, the FDA ripped a large hole in the regulatory
net-a hole through which all transgenic ornamental fish, and
quite possibly all pets, may escape.97 Indeed, proponents of
other transgenic animals have already seized on GloFish as a
precedent for how the FDA should approach non-food
transgenic animals. For example, Simon Brodie, CEO of
Allerca Inc. and proponent of transgenic cats and deer, has
been quoted as claiming that "[a]s long as people don't start
eating cats and they don't enter the food chain, then we should
be handled like the GloFish."98
III. THE FDA DID NOT CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
The GloFish decision raises serious questions about the
FDA's capacity to properly consider the environmental concerns
that surround other pending applications, including those
associated with transgenic salmon. The FDA's consideration of
environmental safety was deeply flawed. The FDA stated that
"there is no evidence" that these genetically modified fish "pose
any more threat to the environment than their unmodified
counterparts which have long been widely sold in the United
States."99  Ordinarily, the FDA requires the proponent of a
NAD to provide evidence of environmental safety rather than
staying regulatory consideration absent evidence that the NAD
poses a threat to the environment. Moreover, the FDA
effectively excluded ornamental fish from any regulatory
scrutiny by drawing its authority as narrowly as possible and
only covering those NADs that may pose a threat to the human
2005).
97. For examples of genetic engineering applied to pets, see generally
Doug Moe, Madison: Cat Cloning Capital?, CAP. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004,
available at
http://www.madison.com/tct/opinion/column/moe/index.php?ntid=13867&ntpid
=2 (last visited Mar. 21, 2005); Kristen Philipkoski, RIP: Alba, the Glowing
Bunny, WIRED, Aug. 12, 2002, available at
http://www.wired.com/news/medtech/
0,1286,54399,00.html?tw=wn-story-related (last visited Mar. 21, 2005); Susan
Rubinowitz, Glowing Rabbit Sparks Controversy, available at
http://www.petplace.com/ Articles/artShow.asp?artID=1365 (last visited Mar.
21, 2005); Genetic Savings & Clone, Inc., Missy: Our Inspiration, available at
http://www.savingsandclone.com/aboutus/ missy.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2005).
98. See Elias, supra note 12.
99. Glofish Statement. supra note 6.
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food supply. 100 Such an interpretation not only unduly limits
the FDA's authority under the FDCA, it also flatly contradicts
the FDA's duties under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).101
A. THE FDA FAILED TO COMPLY WITH NEPA
NEPA's central statutory purpose is to prevent agencies
from disregarding environmental issues out of hand.102 To that
end, NEPA regulations ensure that an agency takes a "hard
look" at the effects of its actions.' 0 3 Section 1502.1 of the Code
of Federal Regulations articulates this purpose with great
particularity, establishing that the statement is meant "to
serve as an action-forcing device to ensure that the
[environmental] policies and goals defined in the Act are
infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal
Government."' 0 4  Agencies are compelled to collect and
disseminate information about the environmental consequences
of proposed actions that fall under their respective
jurisdictions. 105 Similarly, the broad dissemination of
information mandated by NEPA permits the public and other
100. In a lawsuit challenging this FDA decision not to regulate GloFish,
the International Center for Technology Assessment and the Center for Food
Safety have asserted that even under this narrow vision of its authority, the
FDA had both the authority and a duty to regulate GloFish. See Complaint,
Int'l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Thompson, No. 1:04CV00062 (D.D.C. filed
Jan. 1, 2004), available at
http://64.78.7.168/pubs/GloFishComplaintl.14.2004.pdf (last visited Mar. 22,
2005) [hereinafter Thompson Complaint]; Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or,
In the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Int'l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v.
Thompson, No. 1:04CV0006 (D.D.C. filed April 19, 2004), available at
http://www.Ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov [hereinafter Defendants' Motion].
101. See generally National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §
4321-4370(f) (2000).
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321; Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S.
360, 371 (1989) ("NEPA promotes its sweeping commitment to 'prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere' by focusing Government
and public attention on the environmental effects of proposed agency action.")
103. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); see also 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (identifying NEPA purposes as including "[t]o declare a national
policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man
and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere .. .to enrich the understanding of
the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation .... ).
For an interesting critique of NEPA, see generally Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333 (2004).
104. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (2004).
105. See id. § 1502.1; 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
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government agencies to react to the effects of a proposed action
at a meaningful time. 106
To achieve these ends, NEPA requires agencies to conduct
environmental reviews on all "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment." 107  NEPA's implementing regulations define a
"major federal action" as an action to include those actions
whose effects "may be major,"1 08 and to cover any "circumstance
where the responsible officials fail to act."'109  NEPA's
implementing regulations further define "effects" and "impacts"
to be synonymous and both terms are interpreted broadly to
include federal actions raising "ecological ... aesthetic, historic,
cultural, economic, social, or health [concerns] whether direct,
indirect, or cumulative."'1 0
Agencies use the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
process to implement this environmental review requirement.
Each EIS must include "any adverse environmental effects
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented,""' and NEPA regulations direct agencies to use
their best efforts to "avoid or minimize any possible adverse
effects" 112 and to explore alternatives "that will avoid or
minimize adverse effects." 113
Twenty years ago, the D.C. Circuit enjoined the National
Institute of Health (NIH) from approving the deliberate release
of genetically engineered organisms without first conducting an
106. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (establishing the timing requirements for
environmental impact statements and emphasizing that the "statement
should be prepared early enough so that it can serve practically as an
important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be used to
rationalize or justify decisions already made.").
107. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
108. See Public Citizen v. Dep't of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1022 (9th Cir.
2003) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18). A coalition of consumer groups sued the
FDA on January 14, 2004, challenging the agency's GloFish decision as a
failure to regulate. In its filings in this litigation, the FDA has defended its
actions by asserting that its GloFish decision was not an agency action, and/or
was not a major federal action. See Defendants' Motion, supra note 100. The
circularity of this claim is striking. Approval of a NAD is clearly a federal
action triggering NEPA review. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 14. The
FDA used substantial equivalence to conclude that a NAD was unnecessary,
and then bootstrapped the lack of a NAD as grounds not to invoke NEPA.
109. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18.
110. Id. § 1508.8.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ii).
112. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(f).
113. Id. §1500.2(e).
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environmental assessment. 114 The NIH had approved the
deliberate release of ice-minus bacteria without conducting an
environmental assessment or an environmental impact
analysis under NEPA. Writing for the majority, Judge J.
Skelly Wright concluded that the NIH has failed to display "the
rigorous attention to environmental concerns demanded by
law."" 5 He pointed out that NEPA would be toothless if
agencies could satisfy their NEPA obligations merely by issuing
conclusory statements that actions producing significant
changes of the status quo, like the first deliberate release of a
genetically modified organism, would have no environmental
impacts." 6  Reading NEPA as the product of a special
congressional concern with the effects of new technology on the
environment, 1 7 the concurring opinion reasoned that release of
genetically engineered organisms needed a level of scrutiny
sufficient both to ensure safety and to reassure the public. 118
Although NEPA has been reinterpreted over the years, this
basic core remains.
The FDA's announcement that it would not regulate
GloFish unleashed the first commercial distribution of a
transgenic animal in the United States and raises eerie
parallels to the NIH's earlier attempt to permit the ice-minus
experiment with no assessment of environmental risks. The
FDA's decision not to regulate (and therefore to permit
marketing of GloFish) was not based on any environmental risk
assessment process. The FDA conducted no EIS, produced no
Environmental Assessment (EA),"9 and made no findings that
114. See Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
115. Id. at 146.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 147. The court noted that NEPA explicitly enumerates "new
and expanding technological advances" as one of the activities with the
potential to threaten the environment. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §4331(a)
(2000)). The court further emphasized that the legislative history reveals a
concern with "[a] growing technological power ... far outstripping man's
capacity to understand and ability to control its impact on the environment."
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-296 at 6, (1969)).
118. See id. at 161 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
119. Under NEPA, an initial EA is used to determine if an in depth EIS is
needed. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(C) (2004). If required, an EIS examines the
long and short-term environmental effects from the proposed action and
alternative actions that could be taken. See id. § 1502.1. Although NEPA
imposes no substantive burden on agency decision making, it does require
procedural protections chiefly intended to prevent agencies from ignoring
environmental concerns in their decision making. See generally id. § 1502.
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GloFish were likely to have no significant impact (FONSI).120
In short, none of the investigative and contemplative steps
required under NEPA were performed and no governmental
agency considered whether unregulated sale of GloFish would
have negative environmental impacts.
This failure is particularly troubling because commercial
production of these fish will inevitably lead to release of some
proportion of these fish into the wild.121 Indeed, dumping of
unwanted aquarium fish and plants is a primary source of
invasive species. The FDA's three sentence opinion plainly
dismissed out of hand all the complex questions surrounding
this kind of intentional release. While many aquarium fish, or
ornamentals, do not survive in the waters of the United
States, 122 there are, unfortunately, ample examples of such fish
not only surviving but reproducing and competing with native
species.123
Here the FDA seems to have undercut NEPA by operating on a "no news is
good news" principle.
120. By contrast, Canadian authorities have seized GloFish, classifying
them as illegal because the fish have not gone through an environmental risk
assessment. See Leanne Dohy & Hanneke Brooymans, GloFish Sales Halted
By Feds: Genetically Modified Species Raises Health Fears, CALGARY HERALD,
Feb. 15 2004, at All. Somewhat ironically, Singapore Agri-Food and
Veterinary authorities have seized Glofish imported from Taiwan. See Chang
Ai-Lien, NUS Glofish To Be Sold in the US ... But Not Here, STRAITS TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2003. The fish developed by a Singapore laboratory are not approved
for sale in Singapore and importers are threatened with jail terms and
thousands of dollars in fines. Id.
121. See Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
Got Fish? Already Tired of that Holiday Gift Aquarium? Think Before You
Dump and Create an Even Bigger Problem (Jan. 25, 2001), available at
http://www.usgs.gov/public/press/ public_affairs/press.releases/prl381m.html
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005). See generally U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S.
DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NON-INDIGENOUS AQUATIC SPECIES DATABASE,
available at http://nas.er.usgs.gov/default.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
122. See Stephen Hsu, Taikong Corporation Leader in Marine
Biotechnology, TAIWAN NEWS, Sept. 28, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR
7441444.
123. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 42 (acknowledging that
intentional and unintentional release of non-native aquarium fish have
already led to severe environmental problems in the United States, with
nearly 150 exotic ornamental fish found in the wild in the United States); see
also Letter from American Ecosystem and Exotic Species Research Scientists,
Attachment: Nonindigenous Organisms in the Aquarium Industry that Have
Been Released into U.S. Waters, to Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt (Oct.
19, 1998) (on file with author) (regarding invasive species and characterizing
zebra danao as "established in the wild in the United States outside its native
range"); Dianna K. Padilla & Susan L. Williams, Beyond Ballast Water:
Aquarium and Ornamental Trades as Sources of Invasive Species in Aquatic
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At the time of this writing, no permanent zebrafish
populations exist in United States waters. However, invasive
populations of zebrafish have been documented in California,
Florida, New Mexico, and Connecticut.124 In all cases, the
invasive species were traced back either to aquarium releases
or to escapes from commercial fish breeding sites.125 There is
certainly no reason to believe that GloFish would escape or be
dumped less often than their unmodified kin. 126 Moreover,
since some purveyors claim that transgenic zebrafish can
survive in waters much colder than those in which zebrafish
are usually found, there is no assurance that genetically
modified zebrafish could not survive in American waters. 127
Yorktown admits that its GloFish are fully fertile, and indeed,
at least one homebreeder has succeeded in not only breeding
GloFish but also in crossing GloFish with other kinds of
zebrafish. 128
Complex as this question is in the United States, it pales in
comparison to the possible risks when aquarium fish are sold in
their center of origin. Zebrafish, for example, are native to the
Indian subcontinent. 129  The aquarium trade is an
Ecosystems, 2 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & ENV'T, 131-38 (Apr. 2004) (concluding
that one-third of the world's worst invasive species are ornamental aquarium
species).
124. Leo Nico & Pam Fuller, Brachydanio rerio, in NONINDIGENOUS
AQUATIC SPECIES DATABASE (revised July 22, 2003), at
http://nas.er.usgs.gov/queries/FactSheet.asp?speciesID=505; see also Decl. of
Susan L. Williams at 2-3, Int'l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Thompson, No.
1:04CV00062 (D.D.C. 2004) [hereinafter Williams Decl.], available at
http://pacer/psc/uscourts.gov (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
125. See Williams Decl., supra note 124, at 2.
126. Zebrafish are a popular research species for genetic engineering,
making this question a pressing one. For example, researchers have recent
demonstrated the possibility of producing human coagulation factor VII in
zebra danios and tilapia. See generally Gyulin Hwang et al., Fish as
Bioreactors: Transgene Expression of Human Coagulation Factor VII in Fish
Embryos, MARINE BIOTECH., Oct., 2004, available at
http://springerlink.metapress.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
127. See Hsu, supra note 122. Unlike Yorktown, Taikong claims to sterilize
ninety percent of its transgenic fish-a rate that it describes as "good
enough." Needless to say, this assessment of safety is strongly challenged by
opponents of the technology.
128. See PFK Reader Breeds GM Fish, PRACTICAL FISH KEEPING, Mar. 2,
2004, available at
http://www.practicalfishkeeping.co.uk/pfk/pages/item.php?news=220 (last
visited Apr. 22, 2005).
129. Zebrafish Info. Network, Univ. of Or. Inst. of Neuroscience, Zebrafish
K- 12, Zebrafish FAQs, available at
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international one, and the FDA's actions make it likely that
these fish will be sold into their center of origin in the relatively
near future. If the FDA, the agency charged with regulating
these transgenic fish does not consider this point, will anyone?
Even though release or escape of GloFish into the wild
might have significant ecological impacts, nobody has
evaluated these impacts. With this decision, the FDA has
loosed into the metaphorical streams of commerce a transgenic,
highly mobile organism with no consideration of the likely
environmental effects the fish will have on the actual streams
of the nation. And, as GloFish pass through the stream of
commerce, these fish will inevitably enter the nation's streams
and waters. One expert characterizes the situation as one in
which regulators were "caught unaware by [the GloFish] ...
and it went forward and went commercial very quickly."'
130
The FDA's NEPA regulations are drafted extremely
narrowly. The FDA does not require its scientists to consult
with experts from other agencies and FDA scientists, though
highly skilled, are not experts in population biology or
ecology-the disciplines raising the biggest questions about
transgenic fish. Even more troubling, the FDA's regulations
categorically exclude from NEPA assessment all NAD
applications for drugs intended for use in nonfood animals.
31
There might be some comfort in the fact that this categorical
exclusion does not apply under exceptional circumstances,
32
but concerns remain. The FDA's casual dismissal of the
unknowns swirling around GloFish suggests that the FDA's
interpretation of "exceptional circumstances" is likely to be very
narrow.133
The fact that the FDA did not invoke this categorical
NEPA exemption for GloFish provides only cold comfort. First,
the FDA's decision that GloFish need not be subject to the
http://www.neuro.uoregon.edufkl2/FAQs.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
130. Gregory Lamb, Glofish Zoom to Market, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jan. 22, 2004 (quoting Eric Hallerman, Professor of Fisheries and Wildlife
Science, Virginia Tech University), at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0122/p14s02-sten.html (last visited Apr. 24,
2005).
131. 21 C.F.R. § 25.33(d)(1) (2004).
132. Id. § 25.15(d).
133. The FDA's general NEPA regulations require that any application for
a categorical exemption, like that for non-food animals, must be accompanied
by a statement that "to the applicant's knowledge, no extraordinary
circumstances exist." Id. § 25.15(a).
20051
MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH.
FDA's regulatory authority is in many ways even more
troubling. Second, the FDA's language in dismissing GloFish,
with its clear emphasis on human health, suggests that the
FDA is unlikely to explore these environmental questions fully
or to engage in any effective NEPA analysis of transgenic
aquarium fish or other non-food transgenic animals.13 4 Thus,
some of the most serious potential impacts of transgenic
animals 13 5-including harm to wild populations through
competition or erosion of genetic diversity with the attendant
decrease in community resilience-would appear to fall outside
the government's own characterization of its authority. This is
the result despite a growing body of scientific evidence
suggesting that transgenic animals could involve dimensions of
risk not present for unmodified animals. 136  Responsible
regulatory oversight must consider the environmental effects of
transgenic animals, including released transgenic ornamental
fish before any more such fish are sold in the aquarium
trade. 137
134. The FDA is already under fire for routinely ignoring the
environmental effects of persistent pharmacological compounds in the
environment. See Andrew C. Revkin, F.D.A. Considers New Tests for
Environmental Effects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at A20. See generally Dana
W. Kolpin et al., Pharmaceuticals, Hormones and Other Organic Wastewater
Contaminants in U.S. Streams, 1999-2000: A National Reconnaissance, 36
ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 1202 (2002) (demonstrating the environmental effects).
135. Serious concerns also surround transgenic animals, including
questions of whether these animals can safely be part of the food chain and
whether genetic manipulations are fair to the animals themselves. That said,
the most immediate worries are environmental. See, e.g., James Gorman,
When Fish Flouresce, Can Teenagers Be Far Behind?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003,
at F3; Andrew Pollack, Gene-Altering Revolution Is About to Reach the Local
Pet Store: Glo- n-the-Dark Fish, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, at A12; see also
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOLOGICAL CONFINEMENT OF GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED ORGANISMS 48 (2004), available at
http://www.nap.edulbooks/0309090857/html/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
136. See, e.g., W.M. Muir & R.D. Howard, Fitness Components and
Ecological Risk of Transgenic Release: A Model Using Japanese Medaka, 158
AM. NATURALIST, 1 (2001); W.M. Muir & R.D. Howard, Possible Ecological
Risks of Transgenic Organism Release When Transgenes Affect Mating
Success: Sexual Selection and the Trojan Gene Hypothesis, 96 PROC. NAT'L.
ACAD. SCI. 13,853-56 (Nov. 23, 1999) [hereinafter Muir & Howard, Possible
Ecological Risks].
137. Indeed, under Executive Order 13,112, each federal agency is
required:
3) not authorize, fund, or carry out actions that it believes are likely
to cause or promote the introduction or spread of invasive species in
the United States or elsewhere unless, pursuant to guidelines that it
has prescribed, the agency has determined and made public its
[Vol. 6:2
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IV. THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK VERSUS
STATUTORY MANDATES
When regulating biotech food crops, the FDA treats
genetically modified foods as "substantially equivalent" to their
conventional counterparts. 138  Substantial equivalence is a
term from the Coordinated Framework 139-the Executive
Branch policy document generated in the mid-1980s.
140
Pursuant to the Coordinated Framework, the FDA presumes
the safety of novel chimeric foods and regulates only if there is
evidence that a genetically modified food produces a risk
different from those posed by its unmodified cousins.141 The
FDA's failure to fulfill its statutory mandates with regard to
transgenic fish grows from a misapplication of this same notion
of substantial equivalence. Indeed, misplaced notions of
substantial equivalence ring out loudly from the FDA's
statement that: "[tihere is no evidence that these genetically
engineered zebra danio fish pose any more threat to the
environment than their unmodified counterparts which have
long been widely sold in the United States."
1 42
In drafting the Coordinated Framework, the Reagan
Administration considered whether new statutory authority
would be necessary to respond to the challenges posed by
developments in molecular biology.1 43  The Administration
concluded that existing authority could adequately protect the
public from harm from these new technological
developments.1 44 The Coordinated Framework thus represents
determination that the benefits of such actions clearly outweigh the
potential harm caused by invasive species; and that all feasible and
prudent measures to minimize risk of harm will be taken in
conjunction with the actions.
Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6,183-84 (February 3, 1999). Needless to
say, the FDA has neither determined nor made public any such analysis.
138. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed.
Reg. 22,984, 22,985 (May 29, 1992). See also Draft Guidance for Industry:
Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been
Developed Using Biotechnology, 66 Fed. Reg. 4839-42 (Jan 18, 2001). For an
interesting insider perspective that is critical of the Coordinated Framework,
see Sen. Al Gore, Planning a New Biotech Policy, 5 HARV. J. L & TECH. 19
(1991).
139. See generally Coordinated Framework, supra note 8.
140. Id. at 22,302.
141. Id.
142. See Glofish Statement, supra note 6.
143. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 8, at 23,302-03.
144. See id.
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an Executive Branch policy of treating the products of new
techniques for genetic modification as the "substantial
equivalents" of their unmodified counterparts. As the"substantial equivalents" of conventional products, the fruits of
genetic engineering needed no special regulatory regime. Thus,"substantial equivalence" became the touchstone for
integrating evaluation of genetically modified products-plants,
animals, and microbes-into a matrix of pre-existing regulatory
statutes.
In its GloFish decision, the FDA proceeded squarely within
this "substantial equivalence" paradigm. The products of
biotechnology and genetic engineering are presumed to be safe,
and the burden of proof rests with anyone desiring to challenge
that presumption. Unfortunately, this deferential substantial
equivalence vision of regulation conflicts head on with the kind
of assessment the FDA is required to perform under the FDCA.
Because the FDA's GloFish decision had the effect of
introducing a new animal drug into interstate commerce, it is
reviewable under the federal law, 145 just like all other FDA
decisions to permit NADs to enter interstate commerce.
Although the standard of review is deferential, an agency
decision may be set aside if it is arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law.146 In announcing that it would not regulate GloFish, the
FDA implicated all of these grounds.
A. SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE UNDERMINES THE FDA's
ABILITY TO REGULATE TRANSGENIC ANIMALS UNDER THE NEW
ANIMAL DRUG ACT
A close look at the language the FDA used in its
declaration raises warning flags that the FDA discarded the
relevant statutory factors, and replaced them with the principle
of substantial equivalence articulated in the Coordinated
Framework. Such an application is misplaced. The FDA has
already announced that transgenic animals contain new animal
drugs that must be regulated in accordance with the FDCA.
These animals are thus inherently different from, rather than
the "substantial equivalent" of unmodified animals that do not
contain new animal drugs and are, therefore, not subject to
145. See 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2004); see also id. §§ 551-59, 701-06.
146. Upjohn Mfg. Co. v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1982); see
also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
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that portion of the FDCA.
Resort to substantial equivalence is entirely inappropriate
for assessing the safety of new animal drugs. As explained
earlier, the FDCA does not give the FDA authority to grant
waivers from the NAD process, unless the drug is GRAS.
147
The GRAS process is very specific-little is left to agency
discretion. The FDA deviated from these statutorily prescribed
processes for evaluating new drugs, and instead applied the
Framework's notion of "substantial equivalence." This"substantial equivalence" approach led the FDA to substitute
assumptions of equivalence for statutorily-mandated proof that
the transgenic fish is generally regarded as safe and
effective. 148
Rather than applying its statutory authority as delegated,
the FDA, in effect, created an additional threshold question:
whether the NAD is the "substantial equivalent" of its
unmodified counterpart. The FDA thus assumed for itself the
power to grant waivers from the NAD process whenever it
concluded that "substantial equivalence" has been satisfied.
Since under the Coordinated Framework, the FDA is already
committed to the conclusion that the products of genetic
engineering will be the "substantial equivalent" of their
unmodified counterparts, 149 this imputed threshold question
may well eviscerate the FDA's statutory duty to regulate NADs
under the FDCA.
At the very least, applying a "substantial equivalence"
standard to GloFish involved unacceptably shifting the burden
147. For a vigorous academic analysis of the limits on waivers in an
administrative system, see Jim Rossi, Making Policy Through the Waiver of
Regulations at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 47 ADMIN. L. REV.
255, 277-78 (1995); Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule:
Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an
Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163 (1984); Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules,
1982 DUKE L.J. 277 (1982).
148. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (stating that agency action will be improper if the agency
relies on factors which "Congress has not intended it to consider" and fails to
consider statutory factors); Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that the Attorney General exceeded his statutory authority when
he failed to consider statutorily required factors before issuing a directive);
Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (reversing agency decision because court concluded that administrator
had permitted the administration's policies to supplant statutorily identified
objectives for decision making).
149. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 8, at 22,302.
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of proof from the purveyor of a NAD to prove safety to those
objecting to the drug to demonstrate danger. In drafting the
FDCA, Congress created a presumption against marketing or
sale of a product, unless the product's proponent demonstrated
a requisite level of safety is demonstrated.150 The FDA seems
to have used "substantial equivalence" to stand this
legislatively-imposed burden of proof on its head.
Where the statute declares anything not proven safe to be
adulterated and therefore illegal, the FDA announced that it
would regulate GloFish only if presented with evidence of
harm. In doing so, the FDA contradicted its public
pronouncements that transgenic animals would be regulated as
NADs, and instead claimed a hidden, case-by-case discretion to
determine whether a transgenic animal qualifies as a new
animal drug. The GloFish decision thus replaced the NAD
default that marketing of a product be permitted only after
safety has been demonstrated with the Coordinated
Framework's presumption in favor of marketing the products of
biotechnology in the absence of evidence of unique dangers.
B. SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE UNDERMINES THE FDA's
ABILITY TO CONDUCT A NEPA ANALYSIS
Like other federal agencies, the FDA has duties under
NEPA to ensure that its "policies and programs will be
planned, developed, and implemented to achieve the policies
declared by NEPA and required by the CEQ's regulations to
ensure responsible stewardship of the environment for present
and future generations."151 The FDA's use of "substantial
equivalence" as a reason not to engage in a NEPA analysis of
GloFish raises serious concerns about how the FDA will
approach the environmental effects of transgenic fish that do
not qualify for the categorical exclusion. The FDA's NEPA
regulations make it clear that the FDA need not duplicate its
efforts by re-analyzing under NEPA factors that were already
considered under the NAD. With regard to transgenic fish,
however, there are likely to be significant environmental issues
150. The FDCA places the responsibility squarely on the sponsor of a drugto demonstrate that drug's safety, and directs the FDA to approve formarketing only those drugs whose safety has been demonstrated. See 21
U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000). This allocation of responsibility ensures that anysignificant uncertainty about safety or effectiveness is to be borne by a drug's
sponsor not its consumer.
151. 21 C.F.R. § 25.10(a) (2004).
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not encompassed by a NAD evaluation.
Rather than engage in the proper NEPA process, the FDA
relied on "substantial equivalence" to conclude that its actions
fell outside the scope of NEPA. With no evaluation of the likely
or possible environmental effects attendant on sale of GloFish,
the FDA merely assumed that transgenic fish are the"substantial equivalent" of conventional zebrafish, and then
further assumed that this substantial equivalence meant that
GloFish posed no risk to the environment. These assumptions
fly in the face of a significant body of scientific scholarship
detailing the various behavioral and survival differences
between conventional fish and their genetically altered
counterparts 152 and do not account for claims that transgenic
zebrafish can survive under a broader range of temperature
conditions than their unmodified counterparts. In relying on
"substantial equivalence," the FDA also ignored significant
regulatory concerns identified by the National Research
Council 153 and by the FDA itself when it initially asserted this
authority. 154
C. SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE RAISES SEPARATION OF POWERS
CONCERNS
The FDA's GloFish decision represents a serious departure
from the generally accepted structure of constitutional action
for co-equal branches of government. The FDA impermissibly
replaced its NAD statutorily-mandated decisional matrix with
an executive policy position. Agencies cannot overrule
Congress by administrative fiat.155 An agency is entitled to
make decisions based on its view of wise policy but only within
152. See generally R.H. Devlin et al., Increased Ability to Compete for Food
by Growth Hormone- Transgenic Coho Salmon Oncorhynchus kisutch
(Walbaum), 30 AQUACULTURE RES. 479 (1999); Jos6 de la Fuente et al.,
Growth Regulation and Enhancement in Tilapia: Basic Research Findings and
Their Applications, 15 GENETIC ANALYSIS 85 (1999); Anne R. Kapuscinski &
Eric M. Hallerman, Implications of Introduction of Transgenic Fish into
Natural Ecosystems, 48 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 99 (1991); William
M. Muir & Richard D. Howard, Assessment of Possible Ecological Risks and
Hazards of Transgenic Fish with Implications for Other Sexually Reproducing
Organisms, 11 TRANSGENIc RES. 101 (2002).
153. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 108-21.
154. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 21.
155. For a speech by then Assistant General Counsel of the FDA making
this point, see Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 177, 179 (1973).
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the parameters of the authority delegated to it by Congress.15 6
Importing the Coordinated Framework's already problematic
concept of "substantial equivalence" into the GloFish decision
undermines the statutory foundation upon which the
administrative policy of substantial equivalence was built. 157
An administrative policy intended to direct evaluation of
GM products into an existing statutory rubric instead became a
means for avoiding application of that very same statutory
rubric. By shifting primary lawmaking authority from
Congress to the Executive Branch, this use of the Coordinated
Framework circumvents the FDA's statutorily created
mandates and abrogates critical limitations on the scope of the
FDA's delegated authority under both FDCA and NEPA.
Using executive policy to trump not one, but two statutory
mandates implicates significant separation of powers concerns.
Coupled with the executive's assertion that its GloFish decision
is entirely unreviewable, the consequences would be the
Executive Branch creating, implementing, and reviewing its
own authority with no input or constraints from the co-equal
branches of government. With this decision, the potential for
arbitrary agency behavior has skyrocketed, and unfortunately
so has the likelihood of irreversible environmental harm.
156. Even Heckler v. Chaney, which in many ways represented the high
point for court findings that agency decisions were unreviewable, clearly
intended that agency discretion be limited by the statutory mandate. Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985). See also Ronald M. Levin,
Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689,
752-62 (1990).
157. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. 488 U.S. 204 (1988)
(agency power is limited to the authority delegated by Congress and
regulations must be issued within the power conferred by the legislature);
Federal Mar. Comm'n v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255, 258 (9th
Cir. 1964) (agency freedom to regulate is limited by the Congressional intent
expressed in the agency's enabling statute).
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V. THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: ENVIRONMENTAL
RISKS POSED BY AQUACULTURE 158 OF TRANSGENIC
SALMON
The FDA's GloFish decision calls into question both the
scope of the FDA's authority to consider ecological impacts of
transgenic salmon and its willingness to exert whatever
authority it might possess. Regardless of the dubious merits of
the FDA's NEPA and NAD assertions with regard to GloFish, it
is clear that approval of transgenic salmon, or the approval of
other transgenic food animals, would be a major federal action
subject to NEPA and require a NAD. While this technology
seems to hold tremendous promise, it cries out for a regulatory
scheme to maximize the likelihood that transgenic fish are
raised and marketed in a fashion that protects public welfare.
The FDA's disregard, in the context of GloFish, of the very
environmental considerations that will be raised by commercial
aquaculture of transgenic salmon does not engender confidence
that the FDA is willing to engage in the necessary inquiry. As
a result, there is a significant possibility that important
environmental concerns will not find their way into the
regulatory decision making process. Meanwhile, commercial
pressures on the FDA to approve transgenic fish are mounting.
A. SOME DETAILS OF AQUA BOUNTY'S TRANSGENIC SALMON
The FDA is currently considering an application submitted
by Aqua Bounty Farms 159 for what would be the first permit to
grow a transgenic animal commercially for food. 160 Aqua
158. There is a large and growing body of scholarship documenting the
adverse environmental effects of aquaculture generally. That topic is beyond
the scope of this article which focuses on the unique environmental challenges
posed by aquaculture of transgenic fish. Readers interested in aquaculture
more generally should see Rosamond L. Naylor et al., Effects of Aquaculture on
World Fish Supplies, 405 NATURE 1017 (2000); FAO Fisheries Dep't, Review
of the State of World Aquaculture, FAO FISHERIES CIRCULAR No. 886 (1997),
available at http:www.fao.org/docrep/003/w7499e/ w7499e00.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2005); MICHAEL L. WEBER, SEAWEB AQUACULTURE CLEARINGHOUSE,
WHAT PRICED FARMED FISH: A REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL
COSTS OF FARMING CARNIVOROUS FISH (2003), available at
http://www.seaweb.org/resources/sac/pdf/WhatPriceFarmedFish high.pdf.
159. The firm is now known as Aqua Bounty Technologies, Inc.
160. The FDA has not posted the application, nor has it been published in
the federal register. That said, Aqua Bounty officials talk freely about their
application and their hopes for the transgenic salmon they call AquAdvantage.
See, e.g., PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, ONE FISH, Two FISH,
GENETICALLY NEW FISH (Nov. 13, 2003), available at
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Bounty has requested that its transgenic salmon be approved
under the same NAD authority putatively exercised in the
FDA's decision not to regulate GloFish. Aqua Bounty
genetically modifies its salmon by microinjecting a transgene
construct consisting of an ocean pout AFP promoter linked to a
chinhook salmon GH cDNA. 16 1  This transgene construct
enables the fish to produce growth hormone year round, rather
than only during the spring and summer. As a result, Aqua
Bounty's transgenic fish should increase in weight up to six
times faster than nontransgenic salmon.' 6 2  The company
acknowledges that escaped transgenic fish may pose significant
risks to wild salmon populations and more generally that sea
pen aquaculture is associated with negative environmental
consequences.1 63 Aqua Bounty has spent years working with
regulators and with the concerned public to confront these
challenges in a way that makes commercial and environmental
sense.
But for Aqua Bounty's voluntary public disclosure of its
application, however, the Trade Secrets Act 16 4 would have
prevented any public participation in the decision making
process.165 The Trade Secrets Act similarly prevents the FDA
from discussing whether any other applications have been filed
for approval of other transgenic fish.166 As a result, the public
http://pewagbiotech.org/newsroom/summaries/ display.php3?NewsID=543;
Bettina Metzler, Mathias Schmidt, and Eckhard Stein, eds.,
Commercialization of Path-Breaking Transgenic Salmon Faces Stumbling
Blocks (Apr. 5, 2000), available at
http://www.netlink.de/gen/Zeitung/2000/000405h.html (last visited Apr. 22,
2005); see also CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61; Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Altered
Salmon Leading Way to Dinner Plates, but Rules Lag, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2000, at Al; UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
SALMON (Feb. 1, 2001), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/food-and-environment/biotechnology/page.cfmpageID
=327 (last modified July 18, 2003).
161. Erik Stokstad, Engineered Fish: Friend or Foe of the Environment?,
297 SCIENCE 1797, 1797 (2002).
162. Id. at 1799.
163. G.L. Fletcher et al, Current Status of Transgenic Atlantic Salmon for
Aquaculture, in PROCEEDINGS OF 6TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE
BIOSAFETY OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS, available at
http://www.aquabounty.comlabbounty.htm (last visited April 10, 2005).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000). The Trade Secrets Act requires that the FDA
keep secret all of the investigations and pre-market notifications that precede
the release of a new animal drug, including whether or not any such petition
exists. Id.
165. See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000).
166. Id.
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has no idea how many applications for transgenic animals are
pending. The National Research Council has expressed its
serious concern about the consequences of excluding the public
from this process, 167 particularly in light of the explicit
provisions for transparency and public participation in NEPA's
environmental assessment process.
168
Aqua Bounty has voluntarily provided the information that
it has submitted many of the scientific reports required for a
NAD approval. 16 9  The company deserves credit for its
willingness to provide the public this information that it could
legally keep secret. However, depending on the kindness of
strangers, so to speak, is no way to build a regulatory system.
The FDA acknowledges that this duty of secrecy creates a clear
conflict with NEPA170-a conflict moreover that prevents the
FDA from fulfilling its NEPA duty to ensure a public airing of
significant environmental impacts.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS POSED BY AQUACULTURE OF
TRANSGENIC SALMON
Salmon aquaculture, even of non-transgenic salmon, is
already quite controversial, with many scientists claiming that
aquaculture endangers the survival of wild salmon.171
167. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 111; FUTURE FISH,
supra note 29, at 52.
168. Indeed, in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, the D.C. Circuit
specifically acknowledged the importance of public participation before
permitting deliberate release of genetically modified organisms. 756 F.2d 143,
146 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
169. Interview with Eliot Entis, CEO of Aqua Bounty (Oct. 2004) (on file
with author).
170. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 16.
171. One primary environmental concern with regard to aquaculture is the
effect that escaped fish have on wild fish populations. This problem is
discussed more fully in section 3, infra. Aside from escapees, the process of
aquaculture itself raises some serious environmental concerns. For example,
aquaculture sea pens freely discharge salmon feces, fish feed and other organic
wastes into the aquatic environment. This typically results in excess nitrogen
and phosphorous loads in the immediate vicinity of the sea pens. This
nutrient overloading causes eutrophication problems. See Sena S. De Silva,
Feed Resources, Usage and Sustainability, in SUSTAINABLE AQUACULTURE
221-42 (1999). Underneath every fish pen is a footprint or "dead zone"-a
shadow of oxygen depleted and contaminated sediment. United States Pub.
Interest Research Group v. Heritage Salmon, Inc. at 4-7, No. 00-150-B-C (D.
Me. filed Feb. 19 2002), available at
http://www.med.uscourts.gov/opinions/kravchuk/2002/MJK 02192002_1-
00cvl50_ USPISG_vHeritage.pdf [hereinafter Heritage Salmon]; United
States Pub. Interest Research Group v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine at 3-15, No.
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Aquaculture of transgenic salmon may pose enhanced or
different risks to wild salmon, and it is not at all clear that the
FDA has either the scientific competence or the inclination to
consider those risks.
1. Transgenic Fish Might Become an Invasive Species
The possible impact of escaped transgenic fish on wild
populations is probably the greatest science-based concern
raised by the new technology. We already know from
experience with conventional aquaculture that physical
containment measures fail with disturbing frequency.172
Conventional farmed salmon are an environmental nuisance
00-151-B-C, (D. Me. filed May 28, 2003), available at
http://www.med.uscourts.gov/opinions/carter/
20031GC_05282003_1-00cv151_USPIRG v AtlanticSal.pdf [hereinafter
USPIRG 2003]. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 27-29, Int'l Tech.Ctr. v. Thompson, No. 1:04CV00062(RMU) (D.D.C. filed 2004); see also T.H.Pearson & K. D. Black, The Environmental Impacts of Marine Fish Cage
Culture, in ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF AQUACULTURE 1-31 (Kenneth D.
Black ed., 2001). Nutrient loading is, of course, a significant and widespread
problem attributable to many causes in addition to aquaculture.
Nevertheless, nutrient loading from aquaculture can have significant impacts
on a local scale. Proper rotation and fallow periods can minimize these effects
over the long term. Unfortunately, the industry's track record with rotation
and fallow periods is not very good. USPIRG 2003, supra, at 14-18.
In addition to organic wastes, fish farms also release a wide range of
chemical pollutants including pesticides, antifoulants, and antibiotics. The
uncontrolled use of parasiticide drugs like cypermethrin to control sea lice
infestations is particularly problematic because cypermethrin is highly toxic to
many marine organisms. Id. at 4-7. Copper antifoulants are typically used to
retard growth of organisms on the sea pen nets. This copper leaches into the
marine environment where it can be toxic to wild populations. Id. at 6.
172. Alexandra Morton & John Volpe, A Description of Escaped Farmed
Atlantic Salmon Salmo salar Captures and Their Characteristics in One
Pacific Salmon Fishery Area in British Columbia, Canada, in 2000, 9 ALASKA
FISHERY RES. BULL. 102 (2002). The scope of the problem caused by escaping
fish can be staggering. More than 170,000 salmon escaped from a Maine
salmon farm during one storm. See Atlantic Salmon Fed'n, Catastrophic
Salmon Escape Prompts Calls for Moratorium on the Aquaculture Industry
(Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.asf.ca/Communications/
2001/feb/catastrophe.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2005). Another 600,000
escaped from a single incident in the Faroe Islands. Jogvan Gardar, 600,000Faroese Salmon on the Run After Storms, INTRAFISH, Feb. 28, 2002, available
at http://www.intrafish.com/article.php?articlelD=21073&s= (last visited Mar.
23, 2005). Each year, approximately two million Atlantic salmon escape from
aquaculture pens in the North Atlantic. Helen Briggs, Farm Threat to Wild
Salmon, BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2003, available athttp://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/innews /farmthreat2003.htm (last visited Mar.
23, 2005).
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upon escape, competing with wild salmon for food and mating
opportunities and encroaching on the ecological niches of other
species. Transgenic fish that escape into natural ecosystems
could pose a much bigger environmental threat. This danger
mainly arises for those transgenic fish endowed with new genes
that improve such fitness traits like mating success or the
ability to withstand harsh conditions.
17 3
Based on what is currently known about transgenic fish, it
is impossible to adequately predict the environmental outcomes
should these fish escape or be released to the wild. There is
little published information about whether or not adult
transgenic fish are larger than their conventional counterparts
(a variable that tends to relate directly to mating success) but
at least one study has shown that transgenic fish modified to
produce higher levels of GH not only grow more rapidly, but
also grow to a larger size.174 The establishment of a thriving
transgenic fish population in an ecosystem where it has never
existed could crowd out native fish populations. These dangers
are only poorly understood and have yet to be thoroughly
considered by any of the regulatory agencies charged with
protecting and preserving the marine environment. There
simply is not yet enough information to predict when and
where transgenic fish would be likely to become an invasive
species.
2. Transgenic Fish Might Bear Trojan Genes
Beyond these more general ecological effects, there are also
real concerns about the effects of transgenic fish will have on
the genetic diversity of wild populations. A transgenic fish that
has a survival advantage in the wild could out-compete its wild
relatives. For example, some experimental evidence suggests
that transgenic coho salmon modified to express high levels of
GH will be able to out-compete wild coho salmon for food.
175
Changes in the genetic make-up of well-adapted wild
populations may ultimately affect their abilities to withstand
environmental change.
Even if transgenic animals cannot out-compete their wild
173. Robert H. Devlin et al., Population Effects of Growth Hormone
Transgenic Coho Salmon Depend on Food Availability and Genotype by
Environment Interactions, 101 PROCEEDINGS NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 9303, 9303
(2004).
174. de la Fuente, supra note 152, at 89.
175. Devlin, supra note 152, at 479.
20051
MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH.
relatives, transgenic animals might detrimentally affect wild
populations by introducing "exotic" genes into wild gene pools.
Of particular concern is the so-called "Trojan Gene" effect,
whereby transgenic animals that are poorly adapted for
survival nonetheless have a mating advantage.176 For example,
many transgenic fish have been modified to generate faster
growth and/or larger size, traits typically associated with male
mating success.177 These positive fitness traits are balanced by
other characteristics, like reduced swimming speed,17 8 and
aggressive food pursuit, 179 that suggest the transgenic fish may
have a long-term viability disadvantage. This matrix of
favorable reproductive traits and maladaptive pleiotrophic
traits raise concerns that transgenic fish may introduce Trojan
genes to their wild relatives-genes that increase mating
success but decrease ultimate viability. Such genes would
reduce the mean fitness of the wild populations, and in extreme
cases, might drive wild populations to extinction. Possession of
Trojan genes might enable transgenic fish to out-compete their
conventional counterparts at breeding, thus reducing the
overall fitness of the wild population. 8 0
At this point, there is evidence that non-transgenic farmed
salmon exhibit characteristics which might predispose them to
such Trojan gene effects, such as reduced survival of progeny
176. Muir & Howard, Possible Ecological Risks, supra note 136, at 13,853.
Muir applied this predictive model to GloFish and concluded that any released
GloFish could not establish themselves in United States waters as an invasive
species. However, he cautioned, "In my opinion, these fish are safe. Butagain, that's my opinion." Glo;ish Risk, SCIENCENTRAL NEWS, Dec. 23, 2003,available . at http://www.sciencentral.com/
articles/view.php3?article id=218392134&language=english (last visited Mar.23, 2005). He also indicated the expectation that the FDA would conduct an
independent analysis as to the safety of these fish before permitting their sale
in interstate commerce. Id.
177. Yoon Kwon Nam et al., Dramatically Accelerated Growth andExtraordinary Gigantism of Transgenic Mud Loach Misgurnus mizolepis, 10TRANSGENIC RES. 353 (2001): R.D. Howard et al., Mate Choice and Mate
Competition Influence Male Body Size in Japanese Medaka, 55 ANIMAL
BEHAV. 1151 (1998).
178. Anthony P. Farrell et al., Growth-Enhanced Transgenic Salmon Can
Be Inferior Swimmers, 75 CAN. J. ZOOLOGY 335 (1997).
179. Elisabeth Jonsson et al., Growth Hormone Increases PredationExposure of Rainbow Trout, 263 PROCEEDINGS: BIOLOGICAL Sci. 647 (1996).
180. Muir & Howard, Possible Ecological Risks, supra note 136, at 13,853;
Philip W. Hedrick, Invasion of Transgenes from Salmon or Other Genetically
Modified Organisms into Natural Populations, 58 CAN. J. FISHERIES &
AQUATIC SCI. 841, 841 (2001).
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from farmed and wild salmon matings.' 8 ' When coupled with
the growing body of evidence that transgenic fish may possess
both the mating advantage and the viability disadvantage
central to the Trojan gene scenario, 8 2 this concern becomes
pressing, particularly for the many salmon that are listed as
threatened or endangered.
The point is not that aquaculture of transgenic salmon will
doom wild salmon to extinction, but that this is a big question
mark-an unknown that must be carefully considered before
the FDA makes any decision on Aqua Bounty's application.
The Trojan gene possibility is largely based on computer
simulations of non-salmonid reproduction, and on
extrapolations from behavioral studies. Further study is
clearly warranted before conclusions can be drawn. The FDA's
willingness, based on a complete lack of evidence, to declare
that GloFish posed no risks different from its unmodified
counterparts, does not lend confidence that the FDA is up to
this task.
3. Available Biological Containment Methods Do Not Solve
this Problem
In a landmark settlement of a Clean Water Act lawsuit
brought by a coalition of public interest organizations, one fish
farming company agreed to refrain from growing genetically
engineered salmon strains in Maine. 8 3 The same plaintiffs
brought another federal lawsuit against other Maine
aquaculture companies and obtained an injunction banning
transgenic fish from Maine waters pending further safety
181. Ian A. Fleming et al., Lifetime Success and Interactions of Farm
Salmon Invading a Native Population, 267 PROC.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1517, 1517
(2000); Philip McGinnity et al., Fitness Reduction and Potential Extinction of
Wild Populations of Atlantic Salmon, Salmo salar, as a Result of Interactions
with Escaped Farm Salmon, 270 PROC.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 2443, 2443 (2003); P.
McGinnity et al., Genetic Impact of Escaped Farmed Atlantic Salmon (Salmo
salar L.) on Native Populations: Use of DNA Profiling to Assess Freshwater
Performance of Wild, Farmed, and Hybrid Progeny in a Natural River
Environment, 54 ICES J. MARINE SC!. 998, 998 (1997)
182. See generally Hedrick, supra note 180; Richard D. Howard et al.,
Transgenic Male Mating Advantage Provides Opportunity for Trojan Gene
Effect in a Fish, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 2934 (2004).
183. Nat'l Envtl. Law Ctr., Federal Court Bans Frankenfish & Antibiotics:
Judge Approves Landmark Settlement of Clean Water Act Lawsuit Against
Heritage Salmon, Inc. (July 29, 2002), available at
http://www.organicconsumers.org/gefood/frankenfishban (last visited Mar. 23,
2005).
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research.184 In particular, the court ordered that biological
containment mechanisms be explored.18 5
Biological containment can reduce the risks to wild fish
from escapees. In the context of aquaculture, biological
containment typically means raising sterile triploid fish or
sterile transgenic fish carrying anti-fertility genes tailored intotheir genomes.l8 6 Sterilization techniques are relatively easy
and inexpensive, but success rates are highly variable. There is
an overwhelming consensus, even among advocates of thistechnology that neither perfect containment nor 100%
sterilization of GM fish will be possible.18 7  For example,
Yorktown Technology initially claimed that GloFish were
triploid and therefore sterile. However, press reports of fertile
GloFish reproducing are not uncommon.188
Given the huge numbers of fish in commercial aquaculture
operations, typically hundreds of thousands per pen, and the
concomitant large numbers of escapees, even a small
percentage of residually fertile transgenic fish might be enough
to pose all the threats of crossbreeding.18 9 In addition, even
184. USPIRG, supra note 171, at 42-43.
185. Id.
186. P. Alestrom et al., Fish Gonadotropin-Releasing Hormone Gene andMolecular Approaches for Control of Sexual Maturation: Development of aTransgenic Fish Model, 1 MOLECULAR MARINE BIOLOGY & BIOTECHNOLOGY
376, 376 (1992); Robert H. Devlin & Edward M. Donaldson, Containment of
Genetically Altered Fish with Emphasis on Salmonids, in TRANSGENIC FISH229-54 (Choy L. Hew & Garth L. Fletcher eds., 2002); A.R. Kapuscinski & E.M. Hallerman, American Fisheries Society Position Statement on Transgenic
Fishes, 15 FISHERIES 2 (1990).
187. REx A. DUNHAM, STATUS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED (TRANSGENIC)
FISH: RESEARCH AND APPLICATION 15, available atftp://ftp.fao.org/es/esn/food/GMtopic2.pf (last visited Apr. 10, 2005); NormanMaclean & Richard James Laight, Transgenic fish: an Evaluation of Benefits
and Risks, 1 FISH & FISHERIES 146, 166 (2000). Even Aqua Bounty
researchers admit that
[p]resent sterility techniques will probably be adequate for somespecies in most circumstances, but may not sufficiently reduce risks(or be commercially viable) for other species under other conditions.
Considering the lack of present understanding of the fitness . . . ofsuch transgenic fish, it may be exceedingly difficult to predict impacts
in many situations.
ARNOLD SUTTERLIN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS IN USING GH TRANSGENIC
ATLANTIC SALMON AND RAINBOW TROUT FOR COMMERCIAL MARINE
PRODUCTION IN CANADA, available athttp://www.nbiap.vt.edu/brarg/brasym96/sutterlin96.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2005).
188. See, e.g., Dawn Fallilk, supra note 38, at Al.
189. A.R. Kapuscinski & D.J. Brister, Genetic Impacts of Aquaculture, in
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effective sterilization will not necessarily neutralize the risks to
wild populations. Escaped, sterile fish might still engage in
courtship and spawning behavior, and therefore disrupt
breeding in wild populations and decrease overall reproductive
success. Even without reproducing, waves of escaped sterile
fish could also create ecological disruptions by competing with
wild fish. If transgenic fish have a competitive advantage, wild
fish will be overwhelmed as each sterile escapee cohort is
replaced by another equally strong cohort. Transgenic fish that
do not have a competitive advantage would still stress fragile
marine ecosystems through their sheer numbers. Again, the
FDA's GloFish decision does not generate confidence that the
FDA will fully consider these concerns.
4. Transgenic Salmon Might Have an Enhanced Ability to
Transfer Disease
Genetic engineering has also focused on increasing
resistance of fish to pathogens. 190 The possibility of increased
resistance is of obvious commercial interest. However, it does
raise an additional environmental concern. Transgenic fish
might act as reservoirs for diseases and parasites to which they
are resistant-thereby increasing the risk of transferring
diseases and/or parasites to wild populations. 191
Aquaculture already creates disease reservoirs.192  For
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF AQUACULTURE 128-53 (2001).
190. See generally Garth S. Traxler et al., Naked DNA Vaccination of
Atlantic Salmon, Salar salar Against IHNV, 38 DISEASES AQUATIC
ORGANISMS 183 (1999); Niels Lorenzen et al., Immunity to VHS Virus in
Rainbow Trout, 172 AQUACULTURE 41 (1999); Philippa Melamed et al., The
Potential Impact of Modern Biotechnology on Fish Aquaculture, 204
AQUACULTURE 255 (2002).
191. See, e.g., 0. Tully et al., Spatial and Temporal Variation in the
Infestation of Sea Trout (Salmo trutta L.) by Caligid Copepod Lepeophtheirus
salmonis (Kroyer) in Relation to Sources of Infection in Ireland, 119
PARASITOLOGY 41 (1999).
192. Aquaculture crowds carnivorous fish into densities not found in the
wild. A typical sea pen can contain anywhere from 5000 to 16,000 fish, and a
single farm can stock as many as 250,000 fish. USPIRG 2003, supra note 171,
at 6. This crowding facilitates the spread of disease among the farmed fish.
Because the sea pens are open to the environment, pathogens can be dispersed
by tidal currents or from feces and urine of infected salmon. The population
density within a sea pen allows the amplification of pathogen and parasite
loads for subsequent transmission back to wild populations. See Richard L.
Saunders, Potential Interaction Between Cultured and Wild Atlantic Salmon,
98 AQUACULTURE 51, 52-55 (1991). Farmed fish thus serve as a reservoir for
diseases that can be spread to wild fish. See generally C.D. Todd et al., Genetic
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example, sea lice infestations are endemic in most areas with
intensive salmon culture.193 Salmon farms have been
correlated with a more than three-fold increase in abundance of
lice infestations of wild fish.194 When salmon farms are
situated along salmon migration routes, or in wild salmon
habitats, the results can be devastating to already-endangered
wild populations. For example, major sea lice infestations in
British Columbia have been correlated with significant
decreases in numbers of fish returning to spawn,195 and are
believed to be responsible for the catastrophic collapse of the
wild sea trout population.196 Bacterial and viral diseases like
infectious salmon anemia also run rampant in fish farms and
can infect wild populations.197
In conventional aquaculture, the disease reservoir risk
posed by aquaculture is necessarily limited by the possibility
that the disease will kill its host fish. Creating transgenic fish
immune to the disease would increase the risk dramatically
because infected fish could serve as hosts for the infectious
agent without expressing any of the negative manifestations of
the disease. Infected transgenic fish could persist for long
periods of time, thus spreading the infection or disease.
CONCLUSION: WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?
The status quo resembles a vacuum more than it does a
coherent and functional regulatory scheme. States have been
stepping in to fill that vacuum, and, have imposed a growing
Differentiation of Populations of the Copepod Sea Louse Lepeophtheirus
salmonis (Kroyer) Ectoparasitic on Wild and Farmed Salmonids Around the
Coasts of Scotland: Evidence from RAPD Markers, 210 J. EXPERIMENTAL
MARINE BIOLOGY & ECOLOGY 251 (1997); Tully, supra note 191.
193. WATERSHED WATCH SALMON SOC'Y, SALMON FARMS, SEA LICE AND
WILD SALMON (2001), at 10, available at http://www.watershed-
watch.org/ww/publications/SeaLice/SeaLicePaper.html (last visited Mar. 23,
2005); see also David Suzuki Found., Diseases Associated with Salmon Farms,
available athttp://www.davidsuzuki.org/Oceans/FishFarming/Salmon/Diseases.asp (last
visited Mar. 23, 2005).
194. See WATERSHED WATCH SALMON SOC'Y, supra note 193, at 8-9, 11;
Tully, supra note 192, at 49.
195. Rosamond L. Naylor et al., Salmon Aquaculture in the Pacific
Northwest: A Global Industry, ENV'T, Oct. 2003, at 18, 27, 29-30.
196. Pearson & Black, supra note 171, at 20.
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array of restrictions on transgenic fish. 198 State regulation is
an imperfect response to this problem. Indeed many of those
commenting on California's GloFish ban point out how easily
residents can acquire the fish from neighboring states. 199
Piecemeal state regulation also raises the specter of
inconsistent obligations that might make marketing the
products of biotechnology nearly impossible. National
standards are necessary.
To forestall inconsistent state regulation, to promote
confidence in the technology, and most importantly, to protect
human health and the environment, we must develop a sound,
transparent, and credible method for evaluating the
environmental risks associated with transgenic fish. A
consistent program of risk assessment is necessary. Scientists
have already developed the beginnings of a reasonable model
for such a risk assessment. 200 This system is far from perfect
but could be the starting point for a scientifically sound agency
risk evaluation of genetically modified fish. In order for that to
occur, the FDA must live up to its statutory role and must
resolve any conflicts between its statutory mandates and the
Coordinated Framework in favor of fully implementing its
statutory mandates.
The Coordinated Framework must also be reconsidered,
either by the President and the Executive Branch itself or
through legislative action. In particular, it is time to rethink
198. In addition to the California regulatory scheme described earlier, the
following additional state level measures are in place. After USPIRG v.
Heritage Salmon Inc., transgenic salmon are banned in Maine. Oregon and
Washington ban these fish by statute. OR. ADMIN. R. 635-007-0595 (2004);
WASH ADMIN. CODE § 220-76-100 (2004). Maryland prohibits introduction of
transgenic fish into waters of the State that flow into any other body of water.
MD. CODE ANN. § 4-11A-02 (2000). Michigan recently passed a law imposing
criminal penalties for violation of the prohibition against the release of
genetically engineered fish. Michigan Aquaculture Development Act, 2004
Pub. Acts Nos. 270, 272. Minnesota and Mississippi have adopted rules for
the issuance of permits for release of genetically engineered organisms. MINN.
STAT. § 18F.01-.13 (2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-22-9 (2000). Wisconsin has a
notification and review process before release of genetically modified
organisms into the environment. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.60 (2000).
199. See, e.g., Associated Press, California Blocks Sale of GloFish Pets, Dec.
4, 2003, available at http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/innews/glofish2003.htm
(last visited Apr. 22, 2005); Posting of Chris Mooney, California Bans Glofish,
to www.chriscmooney.com (Dec. 4, 2003), at
http://www.chriscmooney.com/blog.asp?Id=478 (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
200. See generally William M. Muir, The Threats and Benefits of GM Fish,
7 EuR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. 654 (2004).
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the decision to make the FDA lead agency for regulating
transgenic fish (and other animals). Because many of the most
critical issues with regard to transgenic fish are environmental,
they do not naturally fall within the FDA's scope of authority.
The situation cries out for congressional clarification of
how transgenic animals should be regulated. Ideally Congress
would decide to channel regulatory decisions to the EPA and
Fish and Wildlife Service-agencies with some expertise in
assessing environmental safety and risks. However, the FDA
must not wait for Congress or the President before undertaking
its own rethinking of how it approaches transgenic animals.
For starters, the FDA should ensure that it fully exercises its
statutory mandates under FDCA and NEPA. Through proper
interpretation of its statutory mandates, the FDA can ensure
that every transgenic animal is subject to a rigorous new
animal drug scrutiny, and can make environmental effects of
these transgenic animals a central consideration in the
regulatory analysis. The FDA should make it clear that, at
least at the beginning when there are so many unknowns,
every transgenic animal will be subject to stringent
environmental and human health assessments. The many
unanswered environmental questions posed in this article and
elsewhere can provide a starting point for the FDA's thorough
and public consideration of any NAD applications it may
receive. Only then will the environmental risks posed by this
technology be addressed and public mistrust assuaged.
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